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Individuals everywhere are interconnected by technology as never before. In 2011 more than 5 billion mobile phone 
subscriptions are in use worldwide, creating connectivity in many parts of the globe where previously we talked only 
of a digital divide. 
Mobile uptake, including access to the mobile Internet, is creating new market forces and reshaping businesses 
around the world, including the business of humanitarian aid.
The global response to the January 2010 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti showed how connected individuals are 
becoming increasingly central to humanitarian emergency response and recovery. Haitians trapped under rubble 
used text messaging to send pleas for help. Concerned citizens worldwide engaged in a variety of ways, from sending 
in donations via SMS, to using shared networks to translate and map requests for assistance.
Powered by cloud-, crowd-, and SMS-based technologies, individuals can now engage in disaster response at an 
unprecedented level. Traditional relief organizations, volunteers, and affected communities alike can, when working 
together, provide, aggregate and analyze information that speeds, targets and improves humanitarian relief. This 
trend toward communications driven by and centered on people is challenging and changing the nature of humani-
tarian aid in emergencies.
Since 2005, the United Nations Foundation and Vodafone Foundation Technology Partnership has leveraged 
the power of mobile technologies to support and strengthen UN humanitarian work in the fields of global health 
and disaster response. We commissioned this report—the sixth in the United Nations Foundation and Vodafone 
Foundation Technology Partnership’s Access to Communications publication series—to examine the challenges 
and opportunities an increasingly networked world presents for delivering disaster relief in the immediate aftermath 
of large-scale humanitarian emergencies. 
Our hope is that this report will spur dialogue and action to harness the potential of evolving communications 
technologies to transform how the world responds to disasters. This work is part of an ongoing conversation and we 
welcome your comments at: www.unfoundation.org/disaster-report.
 
Ted Turner, Chairman
United Nations Foundation
FOREWORD BY TED TURNER
Credit: FAO/Truls Brekke, UN Photo, Internews/Eckert
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
Each major humanitarian disaster rips open a gap 
between the past and present, between what once 
was and what is now.
The 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck less than 
a mile off the coast of Haiti’s capital city of Port-au-
Prince in January 2010 is one of the largest sudden 
onset emergencies the Western hemisphere has ever 
seen, and it struck its poorest country. Damage from 
the quake collapsed poorly constructed housing and 
iconic government buildings alike, frequently crushing 
those within. It also created a chasm between what 
the international humanitarian community knew about 
Haiti prior to the quake and the reality that faced them 
in the quake’s aftermath.
The race to fill this information gap—to assess the 
damage and plan a response—is a dynamic familiar 
to seasoned responders to major sudden onset emer-
gencies. After a large-scale disaster, there is always a 
massive effort to collect and analyze large volumes of 
data and distill from the chaos the critical information 
needed to target humanitarian aid most efficiently. But 
the response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti was different. 
For the first time, members of the community affected 
by the disaster issued pleas for help using social media 
and widely available mobile technologies. Around 
the world, thousands of ordinary citizens mobilized to 
aggregate, translate, and plot these pleas on maps 
and to organize technical efforts to support the 
disaster response. In one case, hundreds of geospatial 
information systems experts used fresh satellite imag-
ery to rebuild missing maps of Haiti and plot a picture 
of the changed reality on the ground. This work—done 
through OpenStreetMap—became an essential ele-
ment of the response, providing much of the street-level 
mapping data that was used for logistics and camp 
management.
Credit: Government of Colombia, OCHA/David Del Conte, Internews/Jacobo Quintanilla
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9The international humanitarian system was not tooled 
to handle these two new information fire hoses—one 
from the disaster-affected community and one from 
a mobilized swarm of global volunteers. This report 
seeks to understand and make recommendations for 
how to adapt to this new reality where collective action 
can lead to collective intelligence.
This work will require partnership and dialogue. Hu-
manitarian organizations have amassed deep wisdom 
and experience from decades of work in the field. Yet 
new voices are opening the possibility of closer inter-
actions with communities affected by disasters. And 
new partners are offering faster, more effective means 
of analyzing an ever-increasing volume and velocity of 
data. The challenge ahead is how to create an effective 
interface between these resources, and create an eco-
system where each actor understands its role.
It will not be easy. Volunteer and technical communi-
ties (V&TCs) like OpenStreetMap, Ushahidi, Sahana, 
and CrisisMappers approach problems in ways that 
challenges the status quo. As organizations, some 
V&TCs are struggling to attain financial sustainability, 
especially when asked to respond to successions of 
major disasters. 
This report recommends a five-part framework for 
addressing these challenges:
1. A neutral forum to surface areas of agreement 
and conflict between international humanitarian sys-
tem and the V&TCs.
2. An innovation space where new tools and practices 
can be explored as experiments, allowing for the fail-
ures that are a necessary component of learning new 
ways of working.
3. A deployable field team with a mandate to deploy 
the best available tools and practices from the 
V&TCso the field.
4. A research and training consortium to evaluate 
the work in the field and to train humanitarians and 
V&TCs alike in the best practices for information 
management in a humanitarian context.
5. A clear operational interface that outlines ways of 
collaborating before and during emergencies, with 
agreed procedures for communication, shared stan-
dards for data exchange and an understanding of 
roles, priorities and capabilities.
Credit: UN Foundation Photo/D. Evans
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INTRODUCTION 
After each major disaster of the modern era, humani-
tarian organizations have reaffirmed a critical lesson: 
good communication is essential to effective coordi-
nation. As a result, many institutions made significant 
investments in information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs). Field workers now rely on tools like 
portable satellite antennae that enable them to have 
Internet communications from many places on the globe. 
Being ‘disconnected’ is still a real problem, but fewer 
humanitarians work without frequent interactions with 
their managers at headquarters in New York, Geneva, 
or other major cities. Rather, the problem is now shifting 
from basic connectivity to information management.
Although the networks that connect humanitarians 
have expanded quickly in recent years, the volume of 
data flowing through these pathways, and the number 
of information sources, have increased at an even faster 
rate. Responders are increasingly struggling to handle 
a growing amount of data, arriving more quickly than 
ever before. This is a problem from the non-emergency 
world that is amplified at times of crisis. Due to poorly 
adapted tools, training and strategies, responders are 
increasingly ill-prepared to produce useful knowledge 
from the flow of information and data. 
For all the new capability in ICTs, the information 
revolution has not led to a fundamental rethinking 
of the methods of coordination and working during 
humanitarian operations. Thirty years ago, humanitarian 
operations were managed with push-to-talk radios, 
paper forms on clipboards, and push pins on paper 
maps. Since that time, the field has undergone a revolu-
tion. Today, many responders read email on their smart 
phones while at meetings and while sending SMS/text 
messages to colleagues. A few perform geospatial 
analysis of incoming data on laptops that not long ago 
would have qualified for supercomputer status. Digital 
02
Without information sharing there can be no coordination. If we are 
not talking to each other and sharing information then we go back 30 
years.      –Ramiro Galvez, UNDAC
“
” 
Credit: WHO/Syed Haider, MapAction, Ushahidi/Jonathan Shuler
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maps get updated frequently, building thematic layers 
for particular purposes. 
And yet, digital maps are printed and posted on walls, 
where they are annotated by hand. Documents have 
migrated from paper to digital files, and are still the 
primary method by which key metrics and supporting 
data gets collected, analyzed, distributed, and briefed 
to decision makers. Paper itself is not the problem: it 
is a durable, cheap, lightweight, and high-resolution 
method that requires no power to use and allows for 
annotations by multiple individuals. The problem is the 
method of creating the content that goes onto paper. 
Today’s predominant method of work relies on a human 
reading each document and distilling the important 
bits for others in their organization or network. It is a 
venerable method, but slow and not easily scalable to 
handling massive increases in data flows without also 
increasing the number of humans reading documents. 
During the response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 
the volume and velocity of data began to overwhelm 
this approach, helped by a new dynamic: the rise of the 
cell phone.
In the developing world, cell phone use has become 
almost ubiquitous. Even some of the world’s most im-
poverished communities now have access to voice and 
data services. After the January 2010 quake, the Haiti 
community used cellular technology to tell the inter-
national community what they needed. Haitians sent 
hundreds of thousands of text messages in through 
social media sites. At the same time, the scale and scope 
of the tragedy created an unprecedented volume of 
information flowing between humanitarian personnel. 
Humanitarian field staff had neither tools nor capacity 
to listen to the new flow of requests arriving directly 
from Haitian citizens. 
This gap did not go unnoticed. Working in communi-
ties, thousands of volunteers from around the world 
aggregated, analyzed, and mapped the flow of mes-
sages coming from Haiti. Using Internet collaboration 
tools and modern practices, they wrote software, pro-
cessed satellite imagery, built maps, and translated 
reports between the three languages of the operation: 
Creole, French, and English. They provided their data 
to each other through interlinked services, so that 
outputs from one effort became inputs to another. 
On the timeline of the Internet’s evolution, the 2010 
Haiti earthquake response will be remembered as 
the moment when the level of access to mobile and 
online communication enabled a kind of collective 
intelligence to emerge—when thousands of citizens 
around the world collaborated in volunteer and technical 
communities (V&TCs) to help make sense of a large-
scale calamity and give voice to an affected population.
That said, the humanitarian system had no formal pro-
tocols for communicating with these volunteer and 
technical communities (V&TCs). Despite the good will 
of field staff, their institutions’ policies and procedures 
were never designed to incorporate data from outside 
their networks. Some view this as a lost opportunity; 
others worry about what this change might mean for 
humanitarians who need to protect data about vulner-
able populations.
Regardless of one’s viewpoint on the contributions of 
V&TCs, the response to the 2010 Haiti quake made it 
clear that the rate of investment in humanitarian infor-
mation management over a complex global network is 
failing to keep pace with new technological realities. 
The humanitarian system could use this revolution in 
connectivity and the evolution of systems for widely 
The absorptive capacity of responders is pretty low. It’s not 
because they do not have an affinity to technology. It’s because 
they are really, really busy 98% of the time, and they are sleeping 
the other 2%.      –Robert Kirkpatrick, UN Global Pulse
“
” 
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We need to fundamentally rethink how the humani-
tarian system manages information in light of the in-
creasingly complex system of networks and dataflows.
 
THE POWER OF NETWORKS
These insights are not novel. In the late 1990s, the in-
ventor of the World Wide Web, Sir Tim Berners-Lee, 
saw that the migration of more and more devices and 
people connected into a shared network would require 
knowledge to be structured and flow in new ways. He 
called it the Semantic Web. 
Technologies are widely available that, in the words of 
Berners-Lee, “will enable better data integration by 
allowing everyone who puts individual items of data on 
the Web to link them with other pieces of data using 
standard formats.” 2 Yet the humanitarian community is 
not collecting or analyzing data in this way yet; in fact, 
they are mired in methods that rely on documents —
methods more suited to the Middle Ages than the 
Internet age.
Many V&TCs, on the other hand, were born within 
the ideals of the Semantic Web. These groups create 
sharing data during the response to a disaster to make 
faster, better decisions in emergencies. 
This report sounds an alarm bell. If decision makers 
wish to have access to (near) real-time assessments of 
complex emergencies, they will need to figure out how 
to process information flows from many more thou-
sands of individuals than current system can handle. 
2010 HAITI QUAKE STUDIES AND AFTER-
ACTION REVIEWS
There have been a number of recent reviews that dis-
cuss the role and impact of the volunteer and technical 
community in the 2010 Haiti earthquake response. 
They include:
Media, Information Systems, and Communities:  
Lessons from Haiti. (Communicating with Disaster  
Affected Communities, Internews, and John S. and 
James L. Knight Foundation, January 2011). 
http://www.knightfoundation.org/research_publications/2011-01-haiti/kf_haiti_report_english_cx2.pdf
Haiti and beyond: Getting it right in Crisis Information 
Management. (ICT for Peace Foundation, April 2010). 
http://ict4peace.org/publications/haiti-and-beyond-getting-it-right-in-crisis-information-management-4
Peacebuilding in the Information Age: Sifting Hype from 
Reality. (ICT for Peace Foundation, 10 January 2011). 
http://ict4peace.org/updates/peacebuilding-in-the-information-age-sifting-hype-from-reality
Haiti Earthquake Relief: One-Year Progress Report. 
(American Red Cross, January 2011).
http://www.redcross.org/www-files/Documents/pdf/international/Haiti/HaitiEarthquake_OneYearReport.pdf
Independent Evaluation of the Ushahidi Haiti Project 
(UHP Independent Evaluation Team, January 2011)
https://sites.google.com/site/haitiushahidieval/news/executivesummaryofpreliminaryfindings
Crowdsourcing Crisis Information in Disaster- Affected 
Haiti. (U.S. Institute of Peace, September 2010). 
http://www.usip.org/publications/crowdsourcing-crisis-information-in-disaster-affected-haiti
Today, the Web is quite effective at helping us to publish and dis-
cover documents, but the individual information elements within 
those documents (whether it be the date of any event, the price 
of a item on a catalog page, or a mathematical formula) cannot 
be handled directly as data. Today you can see the data with your 
browser, but can’t get other computer programs to manipulate or 
analyze it without going through a lot of manual effort yourself. 
As this problem is solved, we can expect that Web as a whole to 
look more like a large database or spreadsheet, rather than just a 
set of linked documents…Locked within all of this data is the key 
to knowledge about how to cure diseases, create business value, 
and govern our world more effectively. The good news is that a 
number of technical innovations…along with more openness in 
information sharing practices are moving the World Wide Web 
toward what we call the Semantic Web. Progress toward better 
data integration will happen through use of the key piece of tech-
nology that made the World Wide Web so successful: the link. 
The power of the Web today, including the ability to find the pages 
we’re looking for, derives from the fact that documents are put on 
the Web in standard form, and then linked together. The Semantic 
Web will enable better data integration by allowing everyone who 
puts individual items of data on the Web to link them with other 
pieces of data using standard formats. 1
“
” 
If you look at the expectations 10 years ago in Afghanistan and 
what a typical humanitarian responder now is expecting in terms 
of services, it has dramatically increased, both in terms of the 
number of systems but also the types and quality of information 
and the bandwidth expectations.      –Alfred Gilman, WFP
“
” 
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open interfaces between their applications where data, 
organized by open standards, can be freely exchanged 
or “mashed up”. This enables users in different domains 
to collaborate; for example, a community that aggre-
gates SMS messages can link with another that trans-
lates them and a third that uses GPS coordinates 
associated with the SMS messages to plot the messages 
on a map.
That said, V&TCs also need to adapt to a reality 
where they are providing valuable services to an 
international system of crisis response and affected 
populations, and therefore must be reliable, con-
sistent, and sustainable. Many of these technology 
collectives are young: some were forged in the heat of 
the Haiti response; others were founded after the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami. Nearly all of these groups 
created ad hoc processes for sharing information in 
response to specific emergencies and are only begin-
ning to think about how to replicate those processes 
for use in other emergencies, make them consistent, 
and bring them to scale. This community must identify 
how to apply the lessons they learned in Haiti to 
future disasters, and how to become reliable, consis-
tent partners around the niche that they perform best. 
The volunteer and technical community can help the in-
ternational humanitarian system adapt to a new reality 
while also directly supporting and empowering local 
communities. The question is, how? And how quickly?
Organizations within the humanitarian system need 
to examine the same questions and consider what 
impact an ever-increasingly networked society will 
have on them. For example, they are just beginning to 
understand what it means to have two-way conversa-
tions with affected populations.
The path forward will be challenging—both for the for-
mal and structured international humanitarian system 
(which is led by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee), 
and for the loosely-structured volunteer and technical 
communities, which thrive on innovation and sponta-
neity. As this report will explore, each community faces 
its own internal organizational challenges figuring out 
how to manage data flows and each brings its own val-
ues to meeting those challenges. 
Most importantly, however, there has not been a mech-
anism for coordinating the collaboration between these 
two groups and no formal channel for these groups to 
engage in dialogue about the underlying problems of 
information management. The humanitarian system 
has few protocols, procedures, or policies governing 
the use of information generated by citizens through 
social media, and the V&TCs are still learning how best 
to support to the work of information managers in the 
humanitarian system. 
 
 
 
Beneficiaries now have a voice, and affected populations have a 
voice. They’re not just recipients, […] they have the ability to talk 
back. That [two-way communication] creates a different dynamic 
around accountability and responsiveness. It also creates a new 
set of ethical responsibilities, especially around expectations and 
whether they can be met. […] [Humanitarian] organizations have 
always prided themselves with being responsive to beneficiaries’ 
needs, and being accountable to them. But there is a now different 
set of tools to make that happen and it is taking some organiza-
tions by surprise.      –Katrin Verclas, MobileActive
“
” 
We have these two worlds, but we are saying the same thing 
effectively: We want to help people who have been affected in a 
crisis. That is our prime objective. We are coming at it from two 
very different directions. What we saw in Haiti was actually the 
beginnings of trying to identify an interface between the two com-
munities.      –Andrew Alspach, OCHA
“
” 
Credit: UN Foundation Photo/D. Evans
The reality is that in a disaster cycle, everyone has a piece of 
information, everyone has a piece of that picture. The more that 
people are able to share information data across ecosystems, 
and the more information that people have to utilize, then we’ll 
really see disaster response really be able to be more effective. 
–Kate Chapman, Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team
“
” 
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ABOUT THIS REPORT 
The purpose of this report is to review what happened 
in Haiti—what worked, what didn’t, and what we can 
extract from that to inform better collaboration between 
the humanitarian system and volunteer and technical 
communities.
It explores how the international humanitarian system 
and volunteer and technical communities approached 
information management during the response (Chap-
ter 2) and how these approaches differed and came 
into tension (Chapter 3). Based on this, the report 
offers guidelines for what an interface between the two 
communities might look like (Chapter 4), and, to stimu-
late further dialogue, presents one prototype model for 
this missing interface (Chapter 5).
The famous mathematician and statistician, George E. 
P. Box once said: “All models are wrong; some, however, 
are useful.” Reducing the complexity of the information 
management dynamics during the response to the 
Haitian earthquake to a simplified model meant omit-
ting key details and simplifying the nuanced contribu-
tions of many stakeholders. With limited time available 
to perform interviews and analysis, the authors expect 
criticism. But this report is not intended to be prescrip-
tive. Instead, the framework outlined in Chapters 4 and 
5 envisions an ongoing dialogue and makes that a priority. 
The report is a springboard for conversation and a frame-
work for action. By exploring the underlying dynamics 
and tensions between the formal and informal systems 
of information management during the Haiti operation, 
the report identifies key challenges and recommends 
an organizational design for addressing some of those. 
 
 
Approach
Traditionally, evaluations focus on lessons learned but 
rarely translate these into actions; instead, they leave 
the lessons identified with no resulting plan to turn those 
insights into revised tools, practices, and policies. This 
report focuses on identifying solvable problems and 
recommending a framework for addressing them—a 
practical plan for dialogue around the interdependent 
operations of several entities involved in information 
management. That said, what follows is not a set of 
definitive recommendations. Instead, it is an approach 
consistent with methods familiar to the humanitarian 
community as well as with the ethos of rough consen-
sus and running code that is at the core of the V&TCs. 
Methods
The research team applied a mixed methods approach 
to untangling the complex dynamics between the 
international humanitarian community and the V&TCs 
during the Haiti operation. Based on requests from 
OCHA, the team interviewed key stakeholders in each 
community using a standard set of research questions. 
The research team and informal advisory group selected 
interviewees according to three initial groups:
÷ Decision Makers: Individuals whose influence 
and experience in emergency operations require 
direct interaction with information and communica-
tions technology.
÷ Key Voices: Individuals whose work is an impor-
tant component of any framework and whose experi-
ence would aid in the mapping of opportunities and 
roadblocks to making desired changes.
÷ Augmenting Voices: Individuals whose voices 
address community level engagement and will 
inform future dissemination of the framework to non-
governmental stakeholders in due time.
 
What follows is an analysis based on known inputs. It is 
not as an academic study of formal history; it is a practi-
cal framework for addressing the problems seen in the 
field. It is the beginning of a conversation.
Credit: UN Foundation Photo/D. Evans
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Additionally, the research team asked interviewees 
about other key individuals to interview. The team 
reviewed the interviews regularly to identify untapped 
issues and groups. In total, 41 individuals were inter-
viewed.
One-on-one and group interviews were performed to 
create opportunities to capture each person’s expe-
riences in the field and their beliefs about their work. 
Fifteen semi-structured questions guided each inter-
view toward: 
÷ personal experiences during the aftermath of the 
Haiti earthquake or experiences during other recent 
humanitarian crises,
÷ interactions with technology at operational, orga-
nizational, and cultural levels,
÷ perspectives on new and existing information flows, 
validation, and effects on field operations, and
÷ attitudes about the synthesis of new V&TCs into the 
changing humanitarian landscape—through the lens 
of humanitarian principles, ethics, and policy. 
Interviewers met with members in person, via Skype, or 
by phone for approximately 1–1.5 hours. The research 
team recorded transcripts and interview notes, which 
they collated, reviewed and coded. The team met 
frequently to analysis interview content.
The team that conducted research for this report was 
composed of members of the humanitarian assistance, 
research, and volunteer and technical communities. 
Their backgrounds include expertise in field operations, 
medical operations, humanitarian technologies, and 
translational research and evaluation. Each brings ex-
perience with UN agencies and NGOs; some actively 
work with V&TCs, some with military disaster response 
units. Some members have many years of experience 
while others are more recent members to these com-
munities. Through their work with the broader community, 
the team developed a composite history of information 
management in Haiti—the subject of the next chapter.
Credit: UN Foundation Photo/D. Evans
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INFORMATION LANDSCAPE
Humanitarian field staff arriving in Haiti to begin the re-
lief effort thought that, after decades of UN involvement 
in Haiti, they would find volumes of data about existing 
operations and be able to use this to identify primary 
tasks for the disaster response effort. They expected 
to be able to access information such as the locations 
of health facilities, demographics by regional depart-
ment, road and routing information, and the locations 
and types of development programs and projects 
underway. The responders also assumed they could 
consult with peers who could explain underlying 
assumptions they used when they collected the infor-
mation and the trends that had emerged over time. 
Instead, in most cases the responders found both these 
data and their curators tragically absent, or simply 
impossible to reach (notably, a few who remained put 
in incredible effort). In the face of one of the largest 
humanitarian catastrophes on record, relief workers 
struggled to access even the most basic data sets; they 
would have to start virtually from scratch. 
Thus began an information race to close the gap 
between Haiti’s past and present. In harsh condi-
tions, and near the noise of taxiing aircraft, arriving 
staff began to rebuild the shared operational datasets 
that they needed to plan and implement a response. 
At the same time, they had to track and coordinate an 
unfolding operation that involved hundreds of regis-
When responders arrived in Port-au-Prince, they faced an 
unprecedented information gap. The foundation on which 
international organizations usually build their operational 
plans—the baseline datasets that described a nation’s sys-
tems for public health, finance, and other critical services—
were hard to find. Many were on hard drives, buried under the 
rubble. Backups were unavailable. And tragically, the curators 
of these data, including staff from the UN peacekeeping mis-
sion in Haiti, MINUSTAH, were too often missing or dead.
Credit: FAO/Truls Brekke, UN Foundation Photo/D. Evans, UN Foundation Photo/D. Evans
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tered NGOs, several militaries, and a Haitian govern-
ment that had lost key decision makers. And they had 
to do so without much input from either the host nation, 
which usually points to available data or information 
systems, or local UN agencies, whose operations had 
been crippled by the collapse of buildings and the sig-
nificant loss of personnel. As one information manager 
put it, 
 
 
The managers in home offices, who did not understand 
why immediate and detailed answers to questions 
about baseline and operational metrics were unavail-
able, put even greater pressure on the humanitarian 
field workers. In twice-daily teleconferences, senior UN 
and NGO staff requested granular bits of data around 
flight prioritization, food delivery, and health facilities. 
The overburdened staff simply did not have the an-
swers to many of the questions and were overwhelmed 
by repeated requests to obtain “situational awareness.”
DRINKING FROM A FIRE HOSE
Against this backdrop of missing data and a shattered 
landscape, arriving humanitarian field staff interviewed 
consistently reported that as they rushed to reassem-
ble data sets and coordinate the relief effort, they felt as 
though they were trying to drink from a fire hose of in-
formation. Yet these same respondents described not 
being able to collate, analyze and transform this into 
the knowledge they needed to make decisions and to 
brief their bosses.
When they started, relief groups lacked verified infor-
mation such as basic street-level maps for dispatching 
search and rescue teams, up-to-date hospital through-
put rates for planning the shipment of medical sup-
plies, road closures and routing for moving aid, and the 
current point of contact for any given NGO working in 
Haiti. Like many emergencies the treacherous race to 
fill this data gap while simultaneously running a mas-
sive relief effort defined the early phase of the Haiti re-
sponse operation.
 
Existing Demands of the Humanitarian System
Amidst the time pressures of their jobs, which for most 
meant 20-plus-hour days, relief workers were expected 
to process a rapid flow of data and extract the elements 
necessary to make sense of the rapidly developing 
crisis. This included the typical emergency tasks of: 
reading numerous emails and coordinating documents 
within their own organizations; having frequent conver-
sations with headquarters and related Skype and chat 
conversations; keeping pace with the flow of rapid as-
sessment data, personal queries from outside visitors 
and partners, situation reports, briefing documents 
and maps from multiple organizations; and attending 
regular interagency coordination meetings. All this was 
ongoing without any significant engagement with non-
traditional actors, or new sources of information and 
analytic support.
 
…the expectation was that we could do more than normal. But, 
because of the […] lack of access to those facilities, we were 
actually able to do the same as if we were in a tent in the middle of 
nowhere. It was one of the most incredibly frustrating things I’ve 
been through.      –Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
“
” 
The challenge in the beginning was that there was almost nobody 
to do the work and then all of a sudden [Haiti] was filled with new 
actors. There was a lack of baseline data. The Ministry of Educa-
tion collapsed and they lost a lot of staff and all [mostly paper 
data] systems. No list of schools survived. We were trying to plan 
rapid needs assessments with almost nothing to go on. 
–Charlotte Lattimer, Save the Children
“
” 
During the first 12–24 hours, there is a fog of information. The sit-
uation is changing rapidly and the numbers are changing rapidly. 
You might as well watch CNN for the changing situation, because 
any product that we did was quickly out of date and overtaken by 
events.       –Dennis King, U.S. Department of State Humanitarian 
Information Unit
“
” 
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Yet even in spite of these challenges, according to 
interviews with experienced field staff, information man-
agement in Haiti did perform well, both in terms of the 
quality and the productivity of their work. Various expe-
rienced emergency responders noted that information 
management tools and processes had improved over 
the past few years, leading to both increased capability 
and increased expectations.
 
The challenge was that the sheer volume of informa-
tion input and number of sources had increased even 
more quickly than expectations had grown, leading to a 
struggle for situational awareness within the humanitar-
ian community and in the general public. 
Although the information management challenges in 
the early phase of the Haiti relief effort had unique as-
pects, such challenges in sudden-onset disasters are 
not new. As Paul Currion noted in February 2001:
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the past decade, the challenge has only in-
creased. Information is flowing at a rate that is increas-
ing exponentially. But investments in methods and 
personnel to handle these increased flows are lagging 
behind. The information gap is now more pronounced 
than ever, not because of a lack of human effort, but 
because communications are growing more com-
plex at a faster rate than current tools and practices 
can handle. And according to interviewees across the 
spectrum, the situation is only going to get worse.
New Data from the Volunteer & Technical Communities
Against this backdrop, volunteer and technology com-
munities rushed to fill the perceived sense making and 
information gap, leveraging social networking and mo-
bile phone-based tools to aggregate, analyze and plot 
data about urgent humanitarian needs. Yet without a 
formal interface for information exchange with the hu-
manitarian system, or appropriate data standards, this 
new data-added to the raging river of information that 
aid workers faced as they struggled to build the relief 
effort from the ground up. As the volunteer and techni-
cal communities continue to engage with humanitar-
ian crises they will increasingly add to the information 
overload problem. Unless they can become a part of 
the solution. 
 
OVER-FILLING THE GAP
How did the humanitarian system that came into Haiti 
facing a yawning information gap end up overloaded 
with too much data? Our research points to four major 
causes that will likely continue in future emergencies: 
[…]by the time that we were two weeks in, there was 1 email 
per minute coming into our team’s email box, 24/7. We needed 
to classify those emails, turn them into information, and then 
group them accordingly so they could be addressed by the dif-
ferent [teams] that had expertise in shelter or health and so on. 
–Andrew Alspach, OCHA
“
” 
…rapid advances in information and communications technology 
have led to a proliferation in the quantity of information available 
to humanitarian workers at all levels—but not necessarily any cor-
responding improvements in their abilities to usefully handle that 
information. 3
“
” 
It got to the stage where, at the end of the first ten days, I had to 
[…] give a talk to everyone in the general meeting, where I said, 
‘look, […] it is right that the senior management in the room is 
demanding more product and information. That’s their role, that’s 
their right, and they should. […] But everybody should realize, that 
we’ve[…] done very well by comparison to where [information 
management] was in the [2005] Pakistan earthquake, or during 
the [2004] tsunami, both in terms of the types of products that 
were outputted, and the types of coordination we managed.’ I just 
wanted everybody to realize that, even though the expectations 
were higher than ever.      –Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
“
” 
Credit: Mark Turner
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1. The cluster system was neither structured nor 
given the resources and tools to deal with the 
complex information dynamics it faced in Haiti. 
The method by which field staff manage informa- 
tion has not kept pace with the increased velocity 
and volume of information flows. Most data handled 
by field workers require their dedicated attention—a 
scarce resource—at every step: data entry, aggre- 
gation, analysis, presentation and briefing. Humans 
—and busy field workers at that—had to take each 
of these information management steps, so it is 
easy to see how the cluster system in Haiti became 
overwhelmed as the volume, tempo, and heterogeneity 
of the information flowing in increased.
2. A growing number of volunteer and technical 
communities (V&TCs) mobilized valuable tools 
for collecting, analyzing, and visualizing data. 
They attempted to share that data with responders, 
and advocated the use of methods that automate 
or outsource parts of the information management 
workflows. However, with the notable exception of 
geospatial data, there existed only ad hoc mean 
to make these new information flows useful to the 
harried field staff from NGOs and UN agencies. As 
a result, both the information that V&TCs submitted 
and the faster methods for information management 
that V&TCs used and shared only exacerbated the 
field staff’s sense of information overload.
3. The affected population became mobile-enabled. 
At the time of the earthquake, the state of cellular 
connectivity in Haiti was such that tens of thousands 
of citizens could, and did, directly communicate 
their needs to a domestic and international audience, 
and those citizens expected that a few thousand 
international responders would be able to monitor 
their hundreds of thousands of requests for aid and 
at least deal with aggregate trends, if not individual 
requests. Some of these increased expectations 
were created by the V&TCs, who were responding 
to messages sent over social media.
4. Expectations of what should be known in 
response operations have dramatically increased. 
Everyone from senior managers at the UN to 
donors and beneficiaries expected the formal hu-
manitarian system to have far better communications 
about what it has discovered and what corrective 
actions it is taking. They demanded a composite 
picture across all specialties and organizations 
involved in the response, but that was unrealistic 
given the humanitarian system’s paucity of technical 
resources and staff, nor with its document-centric 
methods of information collection and data exchange.
These causes are interlinked. Under existing UN 
designs, most data is designed to flow through the 
humanitarian cluster system—a group of UN agencies 
and NGOs tasked with adjacent and sometimes over-
lapping areas of expertise. The cluster processes data, 
analyzes it, and periodically briefs on it to decision 
makers at meetings and through situational reports. 
 
New Data Inflows
During the Haiti response, two new data inflows were 
added to the system: one from the V&TCs and one 
from the affected community of Haitians. These new 
data had to pass through the same humanitarian staff 
already overburdened by work to backfill missing data 
sets. And because these new data feeds were open and 
widely reported in the press, many decision makers in 
the humanitarian system thought that more data was 
available than what they were receiving. This put ad-
ditional pressure on responders to increase their pro-
cessing rate, despite not having adequate resources. 
The following system diagram captures this dynamic. 
 
This chapter explores each of these four basic causes. 
The chapter starts with the base system into which 
V&TCs and the affected population tried to pour new 
information: the information management component 
of the IASC-led humanitarian cluster system.
FLOWS OF DATA TO CRISIS RESPONDERS
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best effort, drawing on years of experience, to develop 
a structure to negotiate the responsibilities for vari-
ous sectors. This organizational design assigns a lead 
agency inside each cluster to be responsible for coor-
dinating the provision of aid in a functional area (e.g., 
water, shelter, etc.). Each cluster coordinates with the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). OCHA, in turn, is the UN agency accountable 
for the overall coordination under the UN Emergency 
Relief Coordinator. 
 
 
While the cluster system solved many of problems of 
earlier systems, it still is evolving. One outstanding is-
sue is the architecture for information management. 
In theory, this information management system is de-
signed to provide decision support services to lead-
ers working on two levels: those who are working in 
the area of functional specialization represented by 
an individual cluster (shelter, health, camp manage-
ment, etc.), and those who are working to coordinate 
the overall system across various clusters. Each of the 
various clusters is responsible for building information 
management systems that tie its various data flows 
into the cluster’s decision making. Likewise, OCHA is 
tasked with building tools that coordinate information 
flows for decision making across the various clusters.
01. CAPABILITIES OF EXISTING INFORMATION 
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
In the initial phase of a response operation, humanitar-
ian groups partner with a host nation government to 
determine what happened and what needs to be done 
to restore civil society and address urgent humani-
tarian needs. In this role, they operate at the edge of 
knowledge—an activity which entails great risk. Deci-
sions made early in the response will lead to alloca-
tions of billions of dollars for future programs. Even 
small errors can lead to uninformed decisions that 
could result in great harm to vulnerable populations; 
the unintended consequences could blight a society’s 
future for years or decades to come. Thus there is a 
tension between the time needed to fully understand a 
complex scenario, and the urgent need for immediate 
humanitarian response. And in large-scale humanitar-
ian emergencies like the Haiti response, the evolving 
nature of the situation requires continuous updating 
and analysis. Respondents consistently reported that, 
no matter how fast information managers operated, 
they were behind where they were expected to be. 
The question is, why? 
Based on interviews, there appear to be three types 
of issues that changed the speed of information 
management: 
1. Structural issues: Aspects of the information 
management design used by the IASC-led cluster 
system that restricted information flows within and 
between clusters.
2. Lack of Resources: Overreliance on underfund-
ed and understaffed information management units.
3. Delays: Delays in information flows due to transla-
tion, collation, and analysis.
 
Structural Issues: 
Cluster System Design Challenges
In the humanitarian system, different actors approach 
problems with varied practices and beliefs about neu-
trality and solidarity, as well as different views on the 
role of international aid. The international community 
has developed “cluster” architecture to align the efforts 
of organizations with these actors’ divergent methods 
and values and minimize the risk of conflict within the 
humanitarian system and with the host-nation govern-
ment. The clusters are the international community’s 
Source: OCHA
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IASC Operational Guidance on 
Responsibilities of Sector Cluster Leads 
and OCHA in Information Management
The cluster lead agency is responsible for ensuring 
information management for an effective and coordi-
nated intra-cluster response. While the design was well 
intentioned, in practice, this research and previous 
reviews have shown that the clusters often do not 
have the resources to perform work beyond their 
own analysis and to devote time and assets to coor-
dinating with OCHA. The clusters tend to manage 
information in a way that is best for their own immedi-
ate needs but not necessarily for the overall system. 
In many cases, the clusters’ choice of closed propri-
etary systems locks data in tools and data formats that 
cannot be easily shared (though many commercial 
software providers are now building open inter-
faces to their systems, this work is not universal). 
This dynamic—where clusters work in their own self-
interest with few resources (and low incentives) to 
invest in overall coordination—appears to have led 
to one of the core information management chal-
lenges in Haiti: information fragmentation, the 
division of data resources and analysis into silos that 
are difficult to aggregate, fuse, or otherwise reinte-
grate into composite pictures. Based on interviews 
with information managers at the cluster level, at 
OCHA, and the CITO’s office, fragmentation occurred 
through this design on two levels: those of the back 
end systems and those of the tools used in the field. 
 
 
Fragmentation in Back-end Systems
As designed, each cluster applied its own back-end 
systems—usually proprietary and contracted to ven-
dors by individual agencies or organizations—to the 
crisis. As is widely known inside the UN, this approach 
has created data silos. These systems had rarely been 
designed to facilitate data exchange directly with the 
information systems from other clusters using open 
(i.e., non-proprietary) data formats. Many systems 
lacked tools—such as data dictionaries—that enabled 
staff using one system to determine programmati-
cally how their own data might be related to data in 
another system. 4 While having agreed inter-agency 
data standards like the Common Operational Dataset 
(COD)—for data like baseline population, road data 
and more—is a step towards solving this problem, field 
staff familiar with the GIS, systems where this data often 
ends up being used, indicate that the COD’s schema 
lack specificity about how to characterize individual 
objects that are important to the response. 5 
Interviews with multiple UN managers and field staff 
indicate that the politics of opening their internal data 
to other UN agencies is itself an issue, let alone open-
ing the data to the hundreds of organizations that part-
nered with the IASC-led cluster system in Haiti. Barriers 
such as cyber security, humanitarian protection 6, and 
distrust loom as large as the technical interoperability 
of proprietary systems. 7 
 
Fragmentation in Field Systems
In the field, most information sharing occurs in face-
to-face meetings at the cluster and sub-cluster levels. 
For anyone who is working in another cluster (or whose 
work prevents them from attending any given meeting), 
the key method of exchanging metrics from assess-
There’s an agreement between how information is supposed 
to be managed within the cluster approach, which means that 
essentially each of the clusters is supposed to manage its own 
information in the crisis. Some clusters, weeks into the disaster, 
were lucky to have a focal point, somewhere where your public 
information officer’s looking out for information management and 
doing their day job. So the clusters themselves didn’t have the 
capacity early on to manage their own information. So what was 
probably happening was even if there were individual attempts 
by NGOs and UN agencies to collect information systematically, 
whether it was an individual assessment of a health facility or a 
much more systematic standardized assessment, the capacity 
then to process that and then share it didn’t exist.
–UN staff member
“
” 
Credit: OCHA/Dan DeLorenzo
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ments is bullet points, shared in web sites, slide decks, 
and emails. This is the primary method of briefing deci-
sion makers in the field and back at headquarters.
 
However, multiple interviewees described a familiar 
problem: the documents used to brief leaders were 
also the method by which staff exchanged information, 
including key metrics. To learn what was going on, one 
had to read documents manually, tracking dozens per 
day. Worse, to get those data back into formats that 
can be used for analysis and tracking, someone had 
to manually re-key those data into another document. 
This was particularly a problem for maps, where the 
map itself was shared as a static graphic, instead of a 
format that could be used for GIS purposes.
 
While meetings of this sort do convey information from 
one human to another, this method of information shar-
ing also assumes incredible memory on the part of 
stressed readers. Relief workers would need to recall, 
for example, three previous hospital throughput rates 
from earlier briefs and furthermore be able to compare 
those past metrics to emerging data. The capacity of 
responders to engage in this type of recall is laudable, 
but the cognitive load placed on overtasked manag-
ers could be lessened by improved methods of infor-
mation sharing. However, because clusters have not 
implemented open data standards, there exists no 
way to pull structured data (like key indicators from the 
SPHERE standards) out of unstructured documents 
like slides and situational reports. There is also no 
way to easily map this information to gain a better situ-
ational awareness so that managers can communicate 
needs and prioritize their decisions.
 
Dispersed pieces, tidbits of data almost, that can’t even be classi-
fied as information, were some of the less useful [information we 
got], because that required an intense amount of resources and 
coordination to turn that into actionable piece information….and 
I’m not just talking from the V&TCs, but also from things getting 
dumped into the emails… if you sort of think about it, we need to 
put it [all] together for the big clusters—big clusters which are 
making multi-million and in this case multi-billion dollar decisions.
–Andrew Alspach, OCHA
Credit: Andrej Verity
VIRTUAL ON-SITE OPERATIONS 
COORDINATION CENTER (OSSOC)
Summary Ovewrview:
÷ 12 USAR Team (around 440 pax and search dogs):  
 BE, FR (2), LU, IS, PL, UK, NL, ES (4).
÷ 2 Field Hospitals (90 pax): BE, FR.
÷ 6 Advanced Medical Posts: EU, FR (3), OT, SE. 
÷ 38 Medical Teams (252 Pax); FR (30), PT (2), DE,  
 ED (2), HU, GR, UK
÷ 6 Water sanitation units: EU, BE, DE, FR, ES (2), and  
 water purification tablets: IT, DE, PT, SE
÷ 1.182 tents for app. 7.600 persons: AT (400 x 6). SE  
 (200 x 5). IT (155 x 8), SI (25 x 10), SK (15 x10), ES  
 (55), PT (65 for 615 pax), BG (67 x 6), PL (200 x 6)
÷ 1 TAST/Base-camp with a capacity of 300 people:  
 this is a joint-module of SE, DK, NO, EE, and FI. 
÷ EU co-financing for transport of assistance requested 
  or approved so far reaches a total amount of EUR  
 3.2 million.
÷ EU CP Assessment and Coordination Team on site  
 since 14.01.2010. A second team has arrived in 
 Port-au-Prince on 23.01, to replace the existing team. 
The other thing that we have is that information management is 
seen as a panacea to coordination problems. So if you have a 
meeting and it’s run effectively with decision points, that’s a very 
effective information exchange for those who are present, with 
well-written minutes and captured very short. But if a meeting 
is run incredibly poorly, disorganized, the notes aren’t captured 
effectively and aren’t disseminated effectively, it’s a waste of time.
–Brendan McDonald, OCHA
“
” 
” 
“
If you want to know where the biggest gap is, it’s the extraction 
of structured data from unstructured inputs. And the unstructured 
inputs are situation reports, emails that go flying around, etc. And 
the structured data outputs would be points on a map with a few 
key values that matter for decision making. And I think there’s 
two reasons we don’t do that… one, we just don’t think that we 
can, two, decisions are currently made on the basis of situation 
reports and verbals, so there’s a decision making culture that has 
to change. That’s a chicken and egg problem, because if you have 
better outputs, you make better decisions. 
–Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
“
” 
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The fragmenting effect of austere conditions
While the tools that field staff had to process this 
information had improved markedly from previous 
disasters, the capacity of personnel to harness those 
tools was far lower than one might expect. First, the 
conditions in the early days were in many ways no bet-
ter those in Banda Aceh after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. Normally reliable equipment failed in the heat 
and dust. Reliable workhorse printers actually caught 
fire trying to keep up with the demand for maps. Radio 
and phone communications were difficult due to air-
craft engine noise less than 100m from the tents. And 
some teams that are accustomed to being within close 
proximity of one another were separated by more than 
one mile that had to be covered by foot.
Across the board, questions about the use of web 
portals received a short and simple response: web 
portals failed to work when accessed from the field. 
 
 
Field staff found the method of exchanging files via 
web portals to be flawed. They often could not afford to 
download large files, particularly those which involved 
datasets, imagery, and new applications. Instead, low 
bandwidth and unreliable access to the public Internet 
left staff relying on paper and data formats that could 
work offline. Portals also tended to provide file dumps 
instead of a common picture or dashboard, requiring 
staff to piece together a situational picture by pains-
takingly reading through lists of documents and blog 
posts; few had time or adequate network bandwidth for 
this activity. Many had no means to exchange data with 
other web sites or services. 
 
Web services, a method of exchanging feeds of data 
between machines—had better success; the data 
tended already to be in structured format, was low 
bandwidth, and could be handled in the background. 
However, it was not well used in the field, and had bet-
ter success among the V&TCs.
 
02. LACK OF RESOURCES
A second barrier to increasing the flows of information 
moving through exponentially increasing number of 
devices and network connections was lack of invest-
ment. This occurred at both the level of inter-cluster 
and intra-cluster coordination. When the dominant 
method of extracting information from analytical prod-
ucts required human intervention, the failure to provide 
adequate resources for information management all 
but guaranteed that coordination across and between 
clusters would be a struggle. 
Inter-cluster Coordination: In the initial days after the 
earthquake, the Office of Coordination for Humanitar-
ian Affairs (OCHA) and UN Disaster Assessment Coor-
dination (UNDAC) team deployed an information man-
Credit: Mark Turner
The operations center for the USAR teams was located in a dif-
ferent place from the operations center for cluster organiza-
tions. They were about 1–1.5 miles apart. The USAR operations 
were in the middle of airport, with the clusters working from the 
logistics base (LogBase). To separate the two was good from an 
operational perspective, but bad in that they were 1.5 miles away. 
Information was not flowing between those two operations, and 
communications between the operations centers was extremely 
limited.      –Gisli Olafsson, Icelandic USAR team
“
” 
During the first 2 weeks of a major disaster, like Haiti, even though 
we had connectivity, we [did] not have the luxury of accessing 
the graphical web, at $6–8/MB for data. And you load a Facebook 
page, with photos/status page, that is 300–400KB. It quickly adds 
up.      –Gisli Olafsson, Icelandic USAR Team
“
” 
It used to be that people showed up at the events with their own 
clipboard. Ten years ago, they showed up with their own laptop, 
and now they show up with their own web-based program. But it is 
still the same problem: none of those can communicate with each 
other.      –David Aylward
“
” 
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agement staff to coordinate information flow between 
clusters, along with a team from the NGO MapAction 
to supply mapping services. These information man-
agers focused on getting the basics completed: reg-
istering thousands of individuals arriving at LogBase, 
building 3W reports (who is doing what where), notify-
ing everyone registered of every cluster meeting, mak-
ing maps, and coordinating the information flows of the 
relief effort. They had no time for additional duties. It 
was all the staff could do to manage the team’s inbox 
(receiving around 1 email per second, which is over 
3000 emails per day), build contacts lists, and handle 
the information flows generated by USAR operations. 
 
 
OCHA and UNDAC were so overstretched that MapAc-
tion staff increasingly assumed a formalized task of 
augmenting information management staff. Even to-
gether, they could not keep up.
Intra-cluster Coordination: Each functional area—
emergency shelter, food, WATSAN (water and sanita-
tion), etc.—was also supposed to have an information 
management staff assigned to process flows of data 
into analyses that could support decision making. 
Most clusters did have small numbers (1-3) of informa-
tion managers who usually wore multiple hats: public 
information officers, data jockeys, technicians, and GIS 
analysts. However, anecdotal evidence points towards 
a problem of “double-hatting”, or multi-tasking by key 
staff in some clusters: many personnel assigned to 
handle information management at the cluster or sub-
cluster level were also expected to perform their “day 
jobs” for their organizations. 
03. DELAYS IN PROCESSING INFORMATION
Several issues increase the likelihood that a given infor-
mation management process would take longer than 
desired. These delays included translation, ad hoc data 
management practices, and fusion of data from mul-
tiple sources. 
Translation: A Perennial Hidden Issue
Multiple sources cited a lack of translation support as 
a perennial problem in international operations. Clus-
ter meetings were held in language that shut out many 
participants and which delayed the communication of 
decisions to those who needed to know.
The classic situation is always information overload. It’s just that 
particularly with better communications, there’s more and more 
email to process. We had one to two people full time doing the 
inbox of the UNDAC team, and to some extent all we could do with 
the email was to forward them to the cluster coordinator, which 
just replicated their problem. And again that’s another task that 
could be done elsewhere, if the process and systems are set up. 
And we’re not talking new tools; we’re just talking a different way 
of using email inboxes.      –Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
Go and look at any evaluation from the last ten or fifteen years. 
‘Recommendation: make effective information available to the 
government and the population in their own language.’ We didn’t 
do it. The maps, English. Now they’re much better, but the first 
month most of the staff didn’t speak French and most of the infor-
mation produced was English… … It is a consistent thing across 
emergencies: how to best disenfranchise the national authorities 
is to run your meetings in a different language.
–Brendan McDonald, OCHA
 
Credit: WFP/Dane Novarlic
“
” 
The clusters themselves didn’t have the capacity early on to man-
age their own information. Even if there were individual attempts 
by NGOs and UN agencies to collect information systematically, 
whether it was an individual assessment of a health facility or a 
much more systematic standardized assessment … the capacity 
to then process that and share it didn’t exist.
–Brendan McDonald, OCHA 
“
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One interviewee told the following story: 
 
 
 
Clusters did not have funding to translate cluster 
meeting notes, and OCHA does not have the resourc-
es to provide this service to each cluster. As a result, 
critical data may have been available to decision mak-
ers, but there was neither time nor funding to allow 
those who speak other languages, including the host 
government, to find or read it. 
Ad Hoc Data Management Practices
Given the tempo of staff rotations, a common com-
plaint is that incoming staff felt lost in a stream of data 
and experienced a steep learning curve. It was a com-
mon practice for staff to use spreadsheets to try to 
come to terms with data—often reinventing the tools 
that departing staff had used, substituting their own fa-
miliar data structure and thereby making the data from 
one staff rotation incompatible with the next. This was 
a result of both lack of commonly accepted tools and 
standards, and the common chaos caused by staff 
duty-cycles in a crisis. Although effective for individual 
staff members, the time invested in this activity—and 
the time lost in translating one person’s spreadsheet 
into the next—needs to be analyzed.
In aggregate, the information management practices 
of the cluster system not only experienced problems 
with information management at both the intra- and 
inter-clusters levels but also were ill-prepared to accept 
information flows from new sources. The information 
managers in Haiti had to confront two such fire hoses: 
one from an emerging V&TC and one from the affected 
population. These are the subjects of the next two sections. 
V&TCS: UNINTENTIONALLY 
OVERLOADING THE GAP
V&TCs are not a new phenomenon in humanitarian 
operations. MapAction is an NGO that has provided 
mapping services to OCHA since the 2003 Bam earth-
quake in Iran. And the NGO Télécoms Sans Frontières, 
which provides satellite-powered voice and data com-
munications in emergencies, has had a formal relation-
ship with the UN emergency telecommunications cluster 
since 2006. In Haiti, both MapAction and Télécoms 
Sans Frontières deployed under OCHA in support of 
UNDAC. Another volunteer community, Sahana, is a 
501(c)3 organization that developed an open-source 
disaster response management system to track people 
and supplies in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. During the Haiti operation, Sahana deployed 
a public instance of its software to coordinate data 
flows between V&TCs and many members of the inter-
national humanitarian system; it also deployed a pri-
vate instance of its software in support of WFP. 
 
Yet in the Haiti response, many new V&TCs were estab-
lished, contributing capabilities that had not heretofore 
been available to the cluster-led humanitarian system. 
Some existing groups refocused their activities and 
came to the forefront. Many of these V&TCs had man-
dates that did not explicitly include deployments to di-
sasters. Some of the newer V&TCs that played a major 
role in the Haiti earthquake response include:
For some reason, UN agencies seem deeply convinced that every-
one on the planet speaks French. In meeting, the Haitian govern-
ment was there. The meeting started with interleaved translation: 
paragraph, then paragraph. The government left, and the last lan-
guage that was spoken was French. The cluster lead continued 
the conversation in French, no translation at all. Twenty minutes 
went by, with apparently major decisions being made. I stepped 
up and said, ‘There is no translation, and clearly things have hap-
pened in last 20 minutes that are major decisions, and it is going 
to be very difficult to revisit those. If we are going to have a meet-
ing in a single language, wouldn’t it be more reasonable to have 
that language be English, since most of the resources are going 
to be coming from English-speaking countries?’ I got booed and 
laughed at. [The meeting continued in French]…. The US military 
representative spoke no French. The USAID representatives in 
room spoke no French. The relief community is not bilingual. They 
may all speak English, but they don’t all speak French… There 
were genuine consequences. The military folks didn’t return. It 
caused divergent pathways in that cluster.      –NGO field worker
Credit: UN/Nancy Palus
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OpenStreetMap is a community of approximately 
150,000 mappers dedicated to building a free and 
open map of the world. Approximately 640 mappers 
participated in the efforts to build an open base map 
of Haiti. MapAction credits OpenStreetMap with provid-
ing an essential service and for building a street map 
of Haiti from scratch in about two weeks, a project that 
should have taken about a year.
CrisisMappers is a community of practitioners in the 
field of crisis mapping, loosely defined as the appli-
cation of geospatial and crowdsourcing tools to the 
analysis of humanitarian emergencies. It was founded 
in November 2009 with approximately 100 members; 
more than 550 participated in the Haiti efforts. The Cri-
sisMappers community, via an email listserve, became 
the central mechanism for coordinating imagery and 
mapping activities in Haiti. Its members included rep-
resentatives from UNOSAT, Google, GeoEye, Digital 
Globe, OpenStreetMap, and the San Diego State Uni-
versity Visualization Lab, which hosted haiticrisismap.
org and its associated web services.
CrisisCamps/CrisisCommons started in 2009 as a 
venue through which crisis response professionals 
could explore ways to share best practices. It trans-
formed into a structure for mobilizing almost 2000 lay-
people (mostly technologists) in 25 cities around the 
world to swarm around information needs generated 
by the Haiti operation.
4636 Alliance is a partnership of FrontlineSMS, the 
Thompson-Reuters Foundation Emergency Informa-
tion Service, InSTEDD, and Internews to offer an SMS 
shortcode and associated services to Haitian citizens. 
It was affiliated with the Communicating with Disaster 
Affected Communities initiative.
Ushahidi is a 501(c)3 organization that offers a soft-
ware platform for managing crowdsourcing projects, 
mostly in the area of election monitoring and interna-
tional development. Ushahidi’s director of strategic 
partnerships mobilized approximately 200 students at 
Tufts University Fletcher School of Diplomacy to moni-
tor and geolocate reports from Twitter, Facebook, and 
the 4636 alliance on the Ushahidi platform. 
 
The History of the Volunteer 
and Technical Communities in Haiti
Despite the damage to structures, many of Haiti’s 
cell towers remained operational, and thousands of 
Haitians sent SMS/text messages from makeshift 
camps, telling the world of their plight. Importantly, 
Haitians were able to send these messages not only 
to other family members but also to public social me-
dia channels such as Twitter and Facebook. Both of 
these services can interact with SMS so that users can 
post messages directly to their profiles from a cellular 
phone. As a result, via the highly connected networks 
of the Haitian Diaspora, requests for extraction from the 
rubble reached far beyond what might be expected—
that is, messaging among small ‘family and friends’ 
networks—and expanded into the common view of a 
global social network. 
These messages were heartbreaking to read and elicited 
a strong emotional worldwide. Many survivors com-
plained of broken bones and lack of food and water; 
they often left clues about an address or location of 
people in need. Others messages probed for informa-
tion about missing loved ones. During past crises, vari-
ous online communities had supported the affected by 
waging online campaigns, from wikis during Hurricane 
Katrina to Twitter during the Iran elections. During the 
Haiti quake, a new dynamic emerged: V&TCs began 
to aggregate, GEOLOCATE, and prioritize incoming 
messages from various social media, and to send the 
reports to urban search and rescue (USAR) teams on 
the ground. Much of this work was possible because 
the V&TCs had established relationships with respond-
ers ahead of the disaster. Among these groups was 
Ushahidi, a Kenyan NGO that originally built SMS-
based tools to monitor elections in its home country.
 
Ushahidi 
Within two hours of the quake, the Ushahidi team 
launched an instance of the software customized for 
Haiti and opened an operation center in a small apart-
ment near the Tufts University Fletcher School of Di-
plomacy, where Ushahidi’s Director of Community Out-
One message arrived from a location listed only as “Un 
Bon Privee.” The hunt for where this business—it turned 
out to be a bookstore—was located took hours, and 
involved research that included finding the resume of a 
former employee on the Web and calling him in NYC at 
2AM local time to ask where the bookstore was in Port 
au Prince. 
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reach, Patrick Meier, was a Ph.D. candidate. Based on 
new code written during the first hours after the quake, 
the modified Ushahidi platform provided a mechanism 
for Patrick’s classmates to begin collating social media 
posts and plotting each message on a map. 
The messages were initially collated by about two 
dozen Fletcher students from Twitter, Facebook, and 
contacts within the Haitian diaspora. The team devel-
oped a quick-and-dirty system for classifying, prioritiz-
ing, and geolocating the tweets using a mix of Google 
Spreadsheets, Microsoft Excel, and Google Maps, 
the same time worked with the Ushahidi development 
team to integrate this type of capability into the soft-
ware. However, this system strained under the volume 
of messages. There were three reasons:
1. Language: Because these text messages ap-
peared in Creole with contractions (as well as errors 
in character encodings that turned accented (diacriti-
cal) characters into nonsensical glyphs or symbols), 
the team quickly learned that it needed translation 
help beyond the capabilities of the Creole speaking 
security guards at the Fletcher School. 
2. Geolocation. Pinpointing the location of a plea for 
help took lots of time and had to be right. However, 
messages often arrived from locations listed by nick-
names or partial addresses. That said, the team was 
under pressure to ensure that each location was veri-
fied, especially if it required sending a USAR team 
into an area with questionable security or required a 
helicopter to ferry a patient to a hospital.
3. Resources. Volunteers came together with no 
budget for even pizza and coffee. They brought 
their own (aging) laptops, which often did not have 
access to GIS tools. And they had no relationships 
with vendors to get them free licenses. For nearly 
two weeks, nearly 20 people on the Ushahidi team 
at Fletcher worked from a small 1.5 bedroom apart-
ment, with their feet overlapping on a coffee table 
surrounded by three sofas. When the laptop of the 
person in charge of geolocations failed, she did not 
have a spare computer; it took several hours to find a 
donor for a new computer (which increased speed of 
lookups by over 100%); meanwhile the geolocation 
team tried to proceed on a borrowed laptop.
The team received help from a coalition of organiza-
tions that came together around the use of SMS to 
reach disaster-affected communities using the 4636 
shortcode.
 
The Race Against Time and the 4636 Shortcode
Working separately from Ushahidi Haiti, several NGOs 
partnered with the U.S. State Department to launch 
a single SMS number for aid requests in Haiti. These 
partners, who included Rob Munro of Stanford Univer-
sity, FrontlineSMS, InSTEDD, Energy for Opportunity, 
and the Thompson Reuters Foundation, worked with 
cell phone carriers in Haiti to set up a resource called 
an SMS shortcode. Like 311 or 411, a shortcode is an 
alias for a longer number that is more memorable and 
easier to communicate to a large audience. The In-
STEDD team arrived within 72 hours of the quake, set-
ting up the core technical infrastructure for the 4636 
Alliance. After some initial technical issues and heroic 
work that has largely remained unsung, the partnership 
was able to get #4636 shortcode running on DigiCel 
(Haiti’s largest carrier).
The period during which responders can rescue some-
one who is trapped under the rubble is short: under 
most circumstances, trapped survivors only have a few 
days before they will die from dehydration, exposure, 
or untreated injuries. To identify where these desperate 
victims might be, the partners advertised the short code 
over Haiti’s radio stations, which largely remained op-
erational or were quickly brought back online through 
the efforts of Internews, which builds citizen journalists 
worldwide.
Credit: Ushahidi
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Messages began to flow into 4636 almost immediately. 
To deal with the flow of information, the partners had to 
build a means for translating these messages from Creole 
to English. Working with the Service Employees Inter-
national Union (SEIU) in the United States, Rob Munro 
of Stanford, mobilized more than 1200 volunteers from 
the Haitian Diaspora. These volunteers initially joined 
Skype chats, providing near real-time translations of 
messages. To support divvying out small tasks to a 
larger population, Rob eventually migrated the volun-
teer-translation system to a crowdsourcing tool built 
by an NGO called Crowdflower, which had established 
operations in Haiti and had even built a call center prior 
to the quake. By day six of the response, Ushahidi 
was fully linked into this new flow of messages com-
ing in from 4636. Soon thereafter, the Sahana Disaster 
Response Management System integrated the data 
coming in through 4636 into its system.
 
Crowdsourcing’s Enabling Technologies 
Connecting SMS information with situational maps of 
needs requires enabling technologies. For instance, 
volunteers could not have geolocated most of the pleas 
for help without maps with street names and building 
outlines. The success of 4636 was in large part due 
to the coupling of SMS with four technologies: 1) tools 
for collecting, processing, and viewing publicly avail-
able high-resolution satellite and aerial imagery; 2) 
Geospatial wiki platform where many people can build 
a common map of the area of interest (AOI); 3) wikis 
were volunteers can collaboratively build up a narrative 
and link to resources; and 4) collaborative platforms 
like Google Docs that had open interfaces to mashup 
data stored in the platform with web services. The most 
common use of this fourth resource was to link a web-
bases spreadsheet to services that could automatically 
plot rows of data on a map.
The first two tools—open aerial mapping and open 
street mapping—were relatively new to the field of 
humanitarian response. While their underlying tech-
nologies existed at the time of prior disasters, the tools 
had not been applied to humanitarian operations on 
a massive scale until Haiti. Therefore, each requires 
a short explanation before getting to how they were 
applied to mapping Haiti’s health facilities.
Collaborative documents like wikis have a relatively 
long and important history in citizen contributions to 
humanitarian response. The Hurricane Katrina Wiki 
was a collaboratively created portal based on the Wiki-
pedia platform (MediaWiki) that provided both situation 
updates and resources and advice for those affected 
by the disaster. It grew out of the initial efforts of the 
Tsunami Wiki, and was followed by locally led and de-
veloped wikis for the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake and 
several other emergencies. For Haiti the ICT4Peace 
foundation developed and maintained a wiki that pro-
vided a collated and curated set of links and resources. 
In a similar vein the NGO InSTEDD regularly provided a 
V&TC oriented “situation report” that gave a snapshot 
of many key activities by new players in the volunteer 
and technology sector. Together these activities can be 
seen as an attempt by the V&TC community to make 
sense of their own activities, and to start to apply both 
individual and collective intelligence to the problem of 
information overload and harmonization of effort. 
 
Credit: UN Photo/Logan Abassi
The questions the Marine Corps was trying to answer were who 
are the NGOs, where are they, what are their needs and how do we 
connect with them to empower them? Simply locating the NGOs 
was a huge piece of the puzzle. UN had a map of NGOs across 
Haiti on January 12, but it was quickly outdated. We relied heavily 
on Ushahidi to locate NGOs.      –Craig Clarke, US Marine Corps 
Civilian Analyst
“
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Crisis Mappers and Open Aerial Mapping
High-resolution imagery—defined here as being able 
to see to the level of one meter—has not traditionally 
been available at the field level for operating agencies 
immediately after a disaster. Imagery can be critical to 
making operational decisions, especially in regards 
to logistics. But imagery also is time consuming to 
process and analyze—a task for which field staff has 
precious little time. During the response to the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami, the UN staff in Aceh had asked 
for detailed imagery of bridge outages so that they 
could design supply chains around the island. They had 
also requested nighttime infrared imagery of the island, 
hoping that that heat of campfires and congregations 
of (warm) people would help the UN identify where the 
populations of destroyed villages had moved. While 
they eventually received some imagery, they never 
received a data set that answered their operational 
questions.
Haiti was an entirely different case. A GeoEye/Google 
partnership released high-resolution imagery of the 
disaster 26 hours after the quake. Digital Globe soon 
followed. What was remarkable was that these provid-
ers released the imagery under an “attribution only” 
license, instead of the usual restrictive licenses that 
prevent derived works and redistribution via other 
online and offline channels. 
Working in coordination with Crisis Mappers, the 
Disaster Risk Management group in at the World Bank 
commissioned the Rochester Institute of Technology 
(RIT) and ImageCat to collect 15 cm aerial imagery of 
Port au Prince. From 21–29 January, the teams flew a 
prop aircraft in box patterns, releasing the imagery into 
the public domain. This transformed the work of the 
response. 
The Haiti imagery would have been useful under any 
circumstance, especially for the UN and the NGOs that 
possessed the requisite geospatial information sys-
tems experts to process the raw imagery into the for-
mats that laptop clients and web services could read 
and write. However, in this case, something unexpected 
happened.
A community of geospatial experts—loosely coordi-
nated by the Crisis Mappers’ mailing list—took it upon 
themselves to become the stewards and evangelists 
for the imagery data. 
HEALTH FACILITY MAPPING WITH  
SAHANA, OPENSTREETMAP, AND CRISIS 
MAPPERS
One of more difficult problems during the Haiti opera-
tion was determining where the health facilities were. 
The lists prior to the disaster were already out of date. 
Once the quake destroyed hospitals and clinics, the list 
became a critical must-have for OCHA. 
The task was daunting. No agency had the definitive list; 
each had what is assumed was a fragment with some 
unknown number of facilities overlapping with other 
lists. Some lists listed the same place in three different 
lines of spreadsheet: one for French, Creole, and Eng-
lish. Some facilities appeared multiple times for other 
reasons, like doctors’ offices that were inside a hospital. 
Faced with a task that required speed and human labor, 
OCHA and MapAction asked the Crisis Mappers com-
munity if it could crowdsource the effort to geo-locate 
105 health facilities that had no location data. WFP made 
a similar request, as did the U.S. Embassy in Haiti. Plan-
ning for this effort began on the evening of 20 January. 
Coordinated through Sahana and OpenStreetMap, this 
effort planned to use satellite imagery, OpenStreetMap 
data, and outside sources to locate almost all these fa-
cilities, using crowdsourcing to fill in the data by distrib-
uting the effort among dozens of people. The request to 
the crowd went out at 2:40AM on 22 January. Approxi-
mately 35 hours later, the team working on the problem 
had located the de facto list of 102 of the 105 missing 
hospitals used on the ground, inputting all the data into 
the Sahana disaster management system. They had ver-
ified each facility by having an OpenStreetMap member 
locate the hospital or clinic on high-resolution satellite 
imagery (15cm resolution) and verify that health facility 
was located at the submitted coordinates.
What happened next is critical to lessons learned from 
the response. Sahana made the data available in open 
data formats via several feed formats, including XML, 
KML, GeoRSS, and the XML schema designed for track-
ing hospital data, EDXL-HAVE. This resource became 
one the best resources for health facility data for the next 
month. Over 8,000 unique individuals visited the site or 
pulled from these feeds. Crowdsourcing had taken a re-
sponsibility that would have taken OCHA days to com-
plete and reduced it to a little more than a day of work. 
In the process, a group of V&TCs had built a process for 
locating health facilities—a process that is now being 
revised for the next disaster.
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This group had first congregated at the International 
Conference of Crisis Mapping in October 2009 and 
included about 100 top subject matter experts from 
the UN, U.S. State Department, the EU Joint Research 
Center, and major academic institutions. Their intent 
before Haiti was to define crisis mapping as a new aca-
demic discipline and to explore means for identifying 
how the analysis and visualization of data flowing from 
humanitarian emergencies could improve response 
operations and recovery. 
Crisis Mappers went far beyond what one would expect 
of an online community. Growing to over 500 members, 
they downloaded many dozens of terabytes of post-
quake imagery from satellite providers, georectifying 
them against pre-quake data sets. Crisis Mappers set 
about analyzing the imagery from many angles: cre-
ating shape files of the emerging IDP camps, building 
thematic maps of potential hazards, even modeling 
potential flooding hazards from a hypothetical tropical 
storm.
Much of the work was centered at academic centers, 
with the San Diego State University/Telascience “hy-
percube” server functioning as the primary platform 
for aggregating the data. Other academic centers—
including the Delta State University in Mississippi—
added complex GIS analyses. This location of the work 
took the load off field staff for processing and analyzing 
imagery—a service to field staff and other V&TCs alike. 
 
OpenStreetMap 
OpenStreetMap (OSM)—a geospatial wiki, akin to a 
Wikipedia for maps—began to displace traditional GIS 
within a week of the temblor, especially for routing data 
and for maps of building footprints in Port au Prince. 
The reason was practical: OSM was able to mobilize 
over 640 volunteers around the world, who scanned 
and rectified old atlases and maps and traced roads, 
bridges, and buildings into the OpenStreetMap geo-
spatial wiki using tools that only required a simple 
web browser and time. In the process, this community 
turned a blank spot on the map into one of the most 
accurately mapped countries in the world—creat-
ing a map far better than any available to the UN. By 
mid-March, OpenStreetMap had become the de facto 
source for Haiti map data within most UN agencies and 
the EC Humanitarian Unit.
 
04. CHANGE IN EXPECTATIONS 
The goal of information management is more than en-
suring that information flows from an origin to its recipi-
ents. When timely and accurate, information enables 
leaders to make well-informed decisions. However, 
leaders at UN headquarters were very clear that they 
did not believe that were receiving detailed information 
about unfolding operations that would enable them 
to know what was going on and to coordinate the re-
sponse. While this expectation for greater visibility into 
the field is expected and right, what is unclear is if exist-
ing structures for information management can supply 
such fine-grained details so early in the response. 
 
The plumbing is better, so why is information 
not flowing? 
Since the Indian Ocean tsunami, the UN and NGOs 
have made enormous investments in communications. 
And it paid off in Haiti: under its mandate, WFP estab-
lished connectivity and power in 22 locations, provid-
ing over 20 megabits of connectivity at LogBase alone 
(a number which was augmented by significant satellite 
connectivity brought by individual teams and greater 
than bandwidth available in many office buildings). 
This investment provided a dramatic increase in the 
availability and use of bandwidth over previous major 
operations (WFP stated that 2 megabits has been the 
average for recent operations). But even this increase 
was not enough to keep pace with demand:
1. Demand for support to mobile devices. WFP 
faced demands to support access to email and the 
Web over handhelds and Blackberries, with major 
usage appearing to be individuals who needed to ac-
cess email (and ask questions of remote staff) during 
meetings while away from their laptops. 
Credit: UN Photo/Logan Abassi
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2. Demand for access to backend office sys-
tems. Many of the 1,200 staff on the ground asked 
for access to backend office data systems, along 
with maps, imagery, and datasets from their respec-
tive headquarters and international partners. Many 
field personnel spoke of an inability to access large 
files and important web sites, including the OneRe-
sponse portal established by the UN for coordina-
tion of information sharing across clusters. One field 
worker was warned against trying to download a 
17MB map file for fear of interfering with the down-
loads of other staff. Others found that downloads 
that might take days in the field were made in a mat-
ter of seconds once they rotated out of theatre and 
got to a broadband connection in a hotel in Florida. 
 
 
 
With all this provisioning of bandwidth and the asso-
ciated costs, management expected information to be 
flowing over the new (and expensive) plumbing. Lead-
ers were demanding greater access to what was hap-
pening in the field; at the same time, managers were 
getting involved in tactical decision making with what 
one person called “the thousand mile screwdriver.”
The coordination of data and its translation into deci-
sion making—information management—is different 
from building the communication pathways via which 
those data are able to flow. The processes that facilitate 
the flows of data and information over ICT infrastruc-
ture have not received the same attention in humanitar-
ian operations as information technology.
Senior managers had high expectations of what should 
be known about the nature of the response. They want-
ed to know not only strategic details, but also deep 
tactical operational details: not only how many tons of 
food had been delivered, where, and by whom but also 
why one plane had been prioritized over another. 
 
 
 
 
From the perspective of many interviewees, senior 
managers in headquarters had unrealistic percep-
tions of how fast certain data could be known. Field 
staff were already racing to fill gaps in knowledge, and 
there are indications that requests for data to support 
the consolidated appeals process (CAP) placed an 
additional burden on people working in austere con-
ditions. This pressure was augmented by improved 
connectivity and bandwidth, which enabled senior 
managers at headquarters to get involved in tactical 
decisions on the ground through twice-daily confer-
ences. This dynamic weighed on their morale—so 
much so, that one information manager felt the need 
to give a speech, both acknowledging the right of man-
agement to expect answers to inquiries but also to 
congratulate the staff on how well they were doing in 
comparison to the work in the Indian Ocean tsunami. 
 
 
 
 
Credit: WFP
On Day One, we had people asking when their Blackberries were 
going to work. Our immediate response was come that was, 
‘Please come back in a couple of weeks, because the service 
provider is not there yet.’ Two days later, we were providing Black-
berry services. It was definitely an eye opener for us. 
–Martin Kristensson, WFP
“
” 
The greatest challenges were—we had them in previous emergen-
cies but they came to a head in Haiti—the requests for detailed 
information about the disaster at all levels at headquarters. 
–Brendan McDonald, OCHA
“
” 
All the major humanitarian agencies have a very significant 
complement of back office applications that are critical to being 
able to respond...Most people coming to an emergency site have 
very high expectations for what technology service will be avail-
able to them. We don’t doubt that in the next emergency, there 
will be people with iPads demanding access to their critical back 
office information over those devices.   –Alfred Gilman, WFP 
“
” 
In a disaster response information management and ICT either 
need to be working seamlessly together or to be considered as a 
package.      –Brendan McDonald, OCHA
 
“
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TRANSLATION AND MAPPING THROUGH 
MISSION 4636 
 
One important part of the 4636 Alliance was the col-
laboration that a team at Stanford established with 
members of the Haitian diaspora to translate thousands 
of messages from Creole into English. In the first days 
of the disaster, Rob Munro (a computational linguist at 
Stanford) began to recruit Creole speakers from Face-
book and other public web sites, asking them to begin 
translating tweets, SMS messages, and Facebook posts 
coming from Haiti. At its peak, the effort had 1,200 Hai-
tians translating thousands of messages per day, usually 
within 4.5 minutes of their arrival. By February, Rob be-
gan a partnership with CrowdFlower, a company special-
izing in quality control for microtasking that was working 
with Samasource, another social venture with partners 
on the ground who could recruit Haiti citizens to perform 
translation services from Haiti. The effort transitioned 
to this professional translation platform soon thereafter. 
This was probably the most important thing we did: to 
help the Haitian community help themselves.
–Rob Munro, Stanford University and Project 4636
05. MOBILE-ENABLED AFFECTED 
 POPULATION
The Haiti operation was not the first time that a disaster 
affected population used SMS to communicate their 
needs: in Banda Aceh, one cellular tower remained 
operational, and SMS was all it could handle. However, 
Haiti did represent a tipping point in the use of social 
media to convey needs to a worldwide audience. 
According to one report, “approximately 85 percent of 
Haitian households had access to mobile phones at 
the time of the earthquake, and although 70 percent 
of the cell phone towers in Port-au-Prince had been 
destroyed in the disaster, they were quickly repaired 
and mostly back online before the 4636 number was 
operational.” 8 Haitians sent hundreds of thousands 
of messages out via SMS to Twitter, Facebook, Usha-
hidi, the Thompson Reuters Foundation Emergency 
Information Service (EIS), and most importantly, to 
members of the Haitian diaspora. 
Thousands of Haitians living in the United States, 
Canada, and several other countries served an impor-
tant role in translating messages from a low-density 
language (Haitian Creole has only 12 million speakers 
worldwide, 9 million which live in Haiti) and conveying 
those needs through channels such as the 4636 alliance. 
 
To make the situation more difficult, the wide adoption 
of mobile phones by Haitian society generated a 
channel by which Haitian citizens could try to com-
municate their needs to the international response 
operation. Haitian citizens were sending tens of thou-
sands of short reports via SMS to social media chan-
nels to tell the world—and international humanitarian 
personnel—what they needed. Over 30,000 text mes-
sages went through 4636 during the first month, with 
about 80,000 total. Some messages contained action-
able information, like a specific medical emergency at a 
known road intersection. Responders had to ask: in the 
absence of a functioning sovereign government, was 
there a responsibility to respond to each individual 
request for help, much like a call requesting an ambu-
lance? What happens if these calls go unanswered? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where I see the real potential, is actually investing our energy 
and efforts into increasing the capacity of local communities to 
effectively prepare and respond to a disaster through effective 
utilization of a variety of new tools and practices that are a result 
of increased access to technology and social networking. Fur-
thermore, to assist them to effectively produce and communicate 
actionable emergency data to the teams of international respond-
ers —in a format they understand and can act on. This is how the 
affected community as the very first responder can become a seri-
ous, valuable and respectful partner during and after emergencies.
 –Jaroslav Varuch, Ushahidi
Credit: Ushahidi
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Interface between the formal and informal 
humanitarian communities
For all the work that the V&TCs performed around Haiti, 
few made direct connections with the field staff at UN 
agencies and the NGOs that were working under the 
cluster system. The reason was simple: although the 
V&TCs had personal relationships with people on the 
ground, these individuals were too busy to both per-
form their jobs and lobby for the use of V&TC tools 
(which would have required changes to standard pro-
cedures) during an emergency operation. Even if these 
individuals had made requests to integrate the informa-
tion from V&TCs, and even when V&TCs sent staff to 
the ground, several barriers emerged:
1.  Lack of Channel. Field staff had no formal chan-
nel to link these new flows of information into existing 
workflows. Those V&TCs which were more success-
ful in connecting into the UN system either did so 
through UNOSAT or other back office connections or 
by deploying staff to the ground.
2.  Verification of Data. Field staff had neither time 
nor methods for verifying data from V&TCs, aside 
from the easy-to-see accuracy of street-level data 
in OpenStreetMap. Crowdsourced reports were not 
(and are not) a replacement for formal assessments; 
they are a complement, signaling where more data 
might be collected. With UN staff scrambling to build 
data from scratch, complements were a luxury, es-
pecially in cases in which the data’s provenances are 
unknown and methods are untested. Many simply 
felt they could not use—or did not have time to figure 
out—the data collected from the V&TCs. 
What was needed was a formal interface into the 
humanitarian coordination system for the V&TCs. The 
challenges to making this happen are the subject of 
Chapter 3.
Credit: Mark Turner
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One measure of the power of a new idea is whether it is 
able to displace traditional practice during periods of 
crisis. At these times, professionals tend to avoid novel ap-
proaches that have not yet been tempered by hardship; they 
instead reach for familiar and trusted ways. This tendency 
is particularly strong within the international organizations 
that deploy their personnel to major disasters. Because field 
staff has learned hard lessons in austere places, they tend 
to avoid assuming new risks. As a result, humanitarian re-
lief operations often deploy older technologies that—while 
imperfect—have been adapted to the harsh conditions of 
the field.
04
BRIDGES AND TENSIONS
In this light, the emergence of the V&TCs and the ex-
tent of their role as part of the Haiti relief effort caught 
many by surprise. No one predicted that volunteer-run 
platforms—many running on free-and-open-source 
software—would not only augment the traditional 
information systems but also provide data that became 
essential to the earthquake response. 
 
And yet, for all the power of the new information flows 
and the opportunities presented by the V&TCs to apply 
web services and collective intelligence to humanitari-
an emergencies, the international humanitarian system 
was not yet tooled to process this information. It does 
not have the resources necessary to adapt to handle 
the new inflows from V&TCs and disaster-affected com-
munities. The international humanitarian system is still 
firmly rooted in a paradigm of documents and data-
Credit: Government of Colombia, UN Photo/ Sophia Paris, OCHA/Laura Sala
In summary, the work by OpenStreetMap, was phenomenal, I hesi-
tate to understate its importance in our work in the field.
 –Nigel Woof, MapAction
“
” 
Haiti has been a revolution. The technology community has en-
gaged for the first time in a very important and permanent manner 
in a humanitarian operation.       –Jacobo Quintanilla, Internews
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bases passed through hierarchies. It is not yet ready 
to exchange knowledge via services, architectures, 
and communities in a flattened, distributed mesh of 
partnering organizations. Nor is the system designed 
to receive individual pleas for assistance from large 
numbers of an affected population and to act on those 
requests on an individual level. But this type of informa-
tion is not going away: even the world’s poorest peo-
ples are beginning to get access to wireless commu-
nications, and Haiti showed that many will not hesitate 
to use this technology to reach out to the international 
community when lives are at stake. What remains to be 
seen is how the international community will retool to 
take advantage of the power of crowds. 
The questions therefore emerge: which aspects of cur-
rent information management practices will remain 
and which must adapt? Why did certain tools used by 
V&TCs and the disaster affected community in Haiti in-
tegrate successfully with the international humanitarian 
system? Why did others experience the equivalent of 
antibody reactions?
While the answer to these questions will be debated 
for years to come, what can be known are important 
dynamics during the Haiti operation that created bridg-
es and exacerbated tensions between the V&TCs and 
the international humanitarian system. This report ex-
plores the dynamics which interviews exposed, leaving 
further discovery and discussion of other issues—per-
haps those more hidden deeper in values and belief 
structures—to conversations which will incorporate 
many more stakeholders. The intent in this chapter is 
not to criticize but to surface issues that should be ap-
proached through the dialogues that Chapters 4 and 5 
recommend. 
 
 
This chapter starts from the core issue of integration—
awareness—and proceeds to explore several more is-
sues that consistently emerged in discussions across 
both communities as critical managing the flows of in-
formation into and out of the international humanitarian 
system: reliability; trust and brand, professionalization, 
open standards, and verifiability. 
 
Awareness
Any analysis of the interactions of the humanitarian 
system and V&TCs during the early period of the Haiti 
response operation must begin with the obvious: in the 
first weeks of the response, most field staff did not even 
know that new V&TCs were offering to help. Those staff 
that did was so overloaded that they could not turn their 
attention away from their immediate responsibilities. 
 
(NOTE: MapAction was generating maps based on 
OpenStreetMap data which may have been used by 
the USAR teams.)
Some organizations devised their own innovative 
means to deal with the information gap they faced go-
ing into Haiti. A good example comes from the experi-
ence of the Icelandic Search and Rescue Team:
I don’t see these two groups as opposing forces. For me it is 
just a matter of time, capacity and coordination to find a way 
to really synchronize our efforts in an effective way.
–Jaroslav Varuch, Ushahidi
“
” 
And that’s why it’s really important to have two kinds of people 
at the table when you’re talking about this. You need to have peo-
ple who know open technology communities, and you also need 
people who understand crisis management. 
–Heather Blanchard, Crisis Commons
“
” 
I didn’t use OpenStreetMap. I didn’t know about it. The only 
rescue team that used it was Fairfax, Virginia on days 8–10. 
–Gisli Olafsson, Icelandic USAR Team
“
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MATCHING NEEDS WITH SERVICE-ICE-SAR 
“Tell them what it is you want”
 
At midnight on day 5, the Icelandic Search and Rescue 
Team (Ice SAR) was tasked to travel to Léogâne by 5am. 
The team leader reached back to a group of volunteers to 
help maximize their situational and geographical aware-
ness- what came to be an informal V&TC. Gisli Olafsson, 
the team leader explained: 
In previous emergencies, we would stay up all night, 
trying to create a plan of action for the day after. 
Instead of doing that, we contacted 24/7 home support. 
We simply told them, ‘Find out anything you can from 
Léogâne, the best maps you can find, identify poten-
tial targets, where are there large building, hospitals, 
shopping, create lists, and GPS coordinates.’ At 4AM, 
in my inbox, was a 2MB PDF document. Maps, pictures, 
school and municipal office locations, contact informa-
tion of the chief of police, mayor, and GPS locations- all 
from GoogleEarth and Google searched information. I 
printed out a 10-page leaflet, with all of that informa-
tion to squad leaders, they read it on the way over there. 
The UK team said, ‘Wow, where did you get that!’ There 
are a lot of tasks like this, which can be outsourced to 
other groups… Also if you think about it from a cost 
perspective, we were able to sleep which is valuable. At 
the same time we were saving money. For a volunteer 
organization this is important.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the V&TCs were producing innovative data and 
applications, their ad hoc connections with traditional 
actors in the field limited the integration of new resourc-
es—like reports generated by Haitian citizens and soft-
ware to process these streams—into core planning at 
the cluster level and at OCHA. In the midst of a major 
crisis and increased expectations from their bosses, 
humanitarian staff relied on tools and processes that 
they trusted, that were familiar to them, and that tied 
into existing workflows. As one information manage-
ment officer at UNDAC said,
Even though some field staff members were tangen-
tially aware of the resources that were available, they 
were too busy to take advantage of the resources or to 
consider the changes to workflows and methods that 
these new information resources would entail. It was 
a key lesson learned for many V&TCs: the introduction 
of new technologies during an active operation can be 
disruptive and ineffective. The right time to make field 
staff aware of new capabilities is between operations.
 
 
 
 
Reliability
A core tenet of the international humanitarian system is 
reliability: a demonstrated commitment to responding 
to any crisis in any place. 
 
 
This expectation is only partly a litmus test about the 
belief structures behind a newcomer; it is also a practi-
cal concern for planning who will perform what role, so 
that scare resources can be allocated to tasks which 
are under-funded. 
 
 
 
Those V&TCs which have successfully integrated with 
the UN over the past decade—MapAction and IM-
MAP—have sent dedicated, trained staff to extremely 
difficult places. In one case, a volunteer MapAction GIS 
analyst had the courage to continue her deployment 
after the UN facility in she was sleeping in was bombed. 
Some individuals had a sense of what that [the V&TC’s] capability 
is, just as a volunteer workforce, not to mention the technical ca-
pabilities. But I think most of straight up crew in info management 
with the traditional ways of doing things did not feel frustration, 
because they did not even realize what had been missed. It was 
more about, ‘How do we execute on tools and processes that we 
know about and are quite standard?’ It was not about what could 
have been done quite differently.       –Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
Emergencies are not the best time to experiment with untest-
ed initiatives. People work around the clock and have hardly 
any time to try out new systems they are not familiar with. 
–Jacobo Quintanilla, Internews
…if you’re jumping into one crisis, then when the crisis happens, 
there is an expectation: the system has to know if it can predict the 
availability of your services and that is a requirement. 
–Nicolas Chavent, Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team
[V&TCs] need to be seen as predictable and reliable. In essence, 
we need to know—whether I’m dealing with Central African 
Republic in a conflict or I’m dealing with a mega disaster—I’m 
going to get the same level of support. Because we need to struc-
ture; the response system has to be predictable. If you want to 
play the game you need to be stepping up each and every time as 
a predictable partner, because people will rely on you.
–Brendan McDonald, OCHA
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HUMANITARIAN OPENSTREETMAP TEAM
As a community, OpenStreetMap is dedicated to provid-
ing a free and open map of the world, which anyone 
can edit and improve. However, if one lives in a country 
with poor existing maps, contributing to OpenStreetMap 
takes some training. One must learn how to use a hand-
held GPS unit, how to input the waypoints and tracks 
from that GPS into an editor, and how to prepare that 
data for addition to ‘the map.’ The Humanitarian Open-
StreetMap Team (HOT) was formed to build the capacity 
of local actors in the developing world to perform this 
role, handing control of the map back to the people who 
actually live in a place.
Over six missions to the island (which continued into 
2011), the HOT team has trained over 500 Haitians in 
basic mapping and assessment techniques. When they 
started in March 2010, they held training sessions for 
3–5 Haitians and internationals at a time. By the fall, 
they were working with mappers from Communaute 
OpenStreetMap Haiti and were training groups of 30–
40. These mappers have adapted to the new challeng-
es of the lifecycle of response and recovery. Working 
with IOM, they have turned over 100 of the IDP camps 
from empty bounding boxes (with some statistics about 
numbers of wells and latrines) into fully-mapped entities 
which display the pathways and location of services. 
And they posted the maps in kiosks, where the com-
munity could learn what was happening in the camp and 
edit the map. On request from IOM, these Haitian Open-
StreetMappers located and mapped 200 schools in Cite 
Soleil in a matter of a few hours, assessing them for 
use as cholera treatment centers. Today, on an ongoing 
basis, these mappers are performing surveys and data 
collection at local offices. 
Few V&TCs have committed to a long-term presence in 
Haiti, have successfully collaborated with large tradi-
tional UN agencies, and have sustainably engaged local 
communities. Humanitarian Open Street Map’s (H.O.T) 
activities continue to this day.
We have transferred most stuff to Haitians…... It’s far 
from disaster response at this point, it’s more preven-
tion and making sure that data is available.
–Kate Chapman
But the newer V&TCs do not yet have the resources to 
mobilize large numbers of volunteers, nor do they have 
the capacity to send small teams to the field for every 
disaster. Most do not even have funds to cover travel or 
communications, let alone deployments of staff on 2–3 
week rotations. Some did not have status as a chari-
table organization until long after the Haiti operation 
had turned to reconstruction, making it difficult to reach 
them with grants, contracts, and other formal funding 
vehicles. Several V&TCs had to instead rely on proxies 
or individual donations.
 
 
 
 
The newer V&TCs have already seen this need to pro-
fessionalize and create a reliable capability. The Crisis 
Mappers community is forming a team called the Stand-
By Task Force, composed of experts who are willing to 
train and deploy to emergencies to provide broad sup-
port for imagery, mapping, and crowdsourcing. Crisis 
Commons received a $1.2M USD grant to explore how 
to create a crisis crowd that can swarm around prob-
lems that require both technical skills and information 
processing capacity. Members of the OpenStreetMap 
community formed the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap 
Team (HOT) to train affected communities how to map 
their own countries. The HOT team was one of the most 
successful V&TCs at creating a reliable, consistent 
operation, despite having almost no funding.
While we appreciate the fact that we were doing something that 
people found useful, the pressure that came to that was incredibly 
difficult to deal with.      –Patrick Meier, CrisisMappers and Ushahidi
“
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These efforts are still nascent. V&TCs are making great 
strides in creating reliable services, but like their prede-
cessors MapAction and IMMAP, they will need partner-
ships within the international humanitarian system to 
succeed. 
Trust and Brand
In most communities, newcomers must earn the trust 
of veterans; it is not automatically granted. This dynam-
ic is amplified in a world where individuals deploy to 
austere locations where societies have been torn apart 
by crisis, and field staff needs to rely on each other to 
get things done. In the humanitarian community, trust 
comes not only from individual actions but also grows 
from the consistent, reliable, predictable presence of 
an organization that abides by humanitarian principles. 
Trust is part of brand. 
 
Many humanitarian organizations invest a great deal in 
building their brand and reputation, sometimes sacri-
ficing opportunities for partnerships or rejecting fund-
ing to protect the network of associations around their 
organization. This is particularly the case for organiza-
tions that send staff to areas where armed conflicts are 
ongoing. To protect their staff under a very fragile but 
critically important aegis of neutrality, these humani-
tarian organizations tend to reject any affiliation with 
aligned parties or militaries.
V&TCs are still working out how these humanitarian 
principles apply to their operations. Many come from 
communities where core beliefs sprung out of technol-
ogy initiatives rather than humanitarian missions. Open-
StreetMap began because geospatial experts in the UK 
felt it was unjust that the National Ordinance Survey 
forced citizens to pay a license fee for access to public 
GIS data. They set out to build a completely free and 
open map of the UK, and then of the world. Ushahidi 
began from Kenyan election violence and the need 
to ‘give testimony’—which is what ushahidi means 
 
in Swahili; it morphed from a blog to an SMS-based platform to 
facilitate submissions of reports from the field. Crisis Mappers 
began as a community of practice seeking to understand how 
to apply new mapping and crowdsourcing technologies to cri-
sis response. None were established as deploying humanitari-
an organizations seeking to aid communities affected by crises.
Among the new V&TCs, only a few deployed people to the field. 
Mission 4636 had people on the ground for the whole emer-
gency phase of the operation. InSTEDD also sent staff for the 
first week following the earthquake. Ushahidi and the Humani-
tarian OpenStreetMap Team sent staff in the following weeks. 
HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES (FROM 
OCHA ON MESSAGE: HUMANITARIAN 
PRINCIPLES PAMPHLET)
Humanitarian principles provide the fundamental foun-
dations for humanitarian action. Humanitarian principles 
are central to establishing and maintaining access to af-
fected populations whether in the context of a natural 
disaster, an armed conflict or a complex emergency. 
Promoting compliance with humanitarian principles in 
humanitarian response is an essential element of effec-
tive humanitarian coordination. It is also central to the 
role of OCHA.
Humanity 
Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is 
found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect 
life and health and ensure respect for human beings.
Neutrality
Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or 
engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or 
ideological nature.
Impartiality
Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis 
of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases 
of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of 
nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or politi-
cal opinions.
 
Operational Independence
Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the po-
litical, economic, military or other objectives that any 
actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian 
action is being implemented.
If there’s a brand that has trust and recognition across the humani-
tarian community, then it has a chance of being worked with…. So 
I think one of the problems working with the volunteer technical 
community is identifying, building the trusted focal points and the 
trusted network. Really it’s about building that brand, and some of 
it is individual to individual, but some of it is being able to say, ‘I’m 
from this group, here’s how you confirm that, and, I’m working on 
this and let’s move together.’      –Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
“
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In all four cases, personal face-to-face relationships 
fundamentally changed the organization’s access to 
members of the international humanitarian system and 
host-nation government. This field presence was criti-
cal for building initial trust and dealing with one of the 
hard realities of complex operations: rapid staff turnover. 
 
 
 
 
Just when a V&TC found entry into an organization, the 
new champion would rotate out of theatre. This dynam-
ic emphasizes the important of building relationships 
between trusted V&TCs before any complex operation. 
 
Even V&TCs see rotations of people in and out of their 
community, especially when a change in life circum-
stances limits a person’s ability to participate in a vol-
untary organization or to engage in the all-consuming 
work that accompanies supporting a megadisaster.
 
 
After Haiti, some groups attained trusted status, or 
at least built sufficient trust within the international 
humanitarian system to be invited to discuss further 
collaboration. That said, this trust—which some field 
staff referred to as a brand—is still new and fragile. 
When some V&TCs did not have as strong a show-
ing in their support in the 2010 floods in Pakistan 
many veteran humanitarians were puzzled. They 
would have liked to have seen greater mobiliza-
tion of resources for a difficult response operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are good reasons why V&TCs had difficulty 
deploying in support of Pakistan: closed information 
management systems, lack of imagery, lack of cellular 
phone adoption in the affected population relative to 
Haiti, distance, and security of personnel who might be 
sent to the field. That said, these issues are technical: 
they relate to the status of V&TCs being on the outside 
of the international humanitarian system, where they 
cannot gain access to imagery put under the Disaster 
Space charter, where they cannot deploy under orga-
nizations that can provide security, and where they lack 
funds necessary for working under far more difficult 
(and distant) situations than were found in Haiti. With a 
When you have an emergency like Haiti where so many lives are 
at risk, you have a lot of instability on the personnel side and the 
overall continuity of the effort. You have so much personnel turn-
over.      –Jeffrey Villaveces, OCHA
…that’s why the face-to-face on-the-ground is always more trusted 
than someone randomly off an email. Particularly, there’s the levels: 
1) there’s the people I know—the people I meet face-to-face, and 
then 2) there’s the people I know remotely already, and then 3) 
there’s the people from organizations I know, and then 4) there’s 
just the random people. And the groups that appear to be the ran- 
dom people are the lowest on the totem.      –Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
To get any information, you have to be on the ground. You have to 
walk around and ask people for it.      –Kate Chapman, Humanitar-
ian OpenStreetMap Team
 
And that then becomes a problem of institutional memory. You 
could have the greatest volunteers today who move on, leaving 
the platform that they supported in limbo. This is a challenge for 
some platforms—particularly if they are very successful—to 
sustain themselves over the longer term.     –Sanjana Hattotuwa, 
ICT4Peace Foundation
The challenge that I have seen, and I have been involved in three 
different emergencies in less than a year’s time, is that it was nev-
er guaranteed that the organization or the group that set up a web-
site or a tool in the first one was going to be there for the second 
and the third. And even NGOs that built fancy tools in Haiti and no 
matter how great they are, they are not showing up with anything 
in Pakistan. So it is all great that we can have 15 different who did 
what where systems out there for one emergency, but then for the 
next one, you know in Kirgizstan, maybe nobody shows up, or 
maybe OCHA does, and then in Pakistan it is something different. 
So for me it is not always just who is authoritative, but also who is 
consistently there and predictable.      –Andrej Verity, OCHA
Credit: WFP
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formal agreement and the funding that would follow, it 
may be possible to help V&TCs become more reliable 
partners to all response operations, large and small. 
 
Professionalization
For members of the international humanitarian system, 
professionalism is a way of life. It means delivering con-
sistent services when called to perform their role in the 
cluster system. Some V&TCs have adopted this mental-
ity. MapAction has been a consistent partner in dozens 
of emergencies and has engaged in monthly training 
exercises with its volunteers since its inception, certify-
ing the capability of each individual on its team before 
he or she deploys. 
Other groups—often those that began in a realm out-
side crisis response—are just beginning the process 
of adopting internal procedures that guarantee consis-
tent, reliable operations. 
Some newer V&TCs have begun debates between 
internal factions, often between technologists who 
wish to provide platforms for general use and crisis 
responders who wish to support the application of 
these platforms to specific humanitarian operations. 
Some have debates between factions who believe one 
technology or method is being advocated above oth-
ers. Others worry that the organizations will need to 
make fundamental changes to their mission and orga-
nizational design to chase the resources necessary for 
transforming a volunteer organization into an institution 
that performs a critical role during a disaster. These 
debates are ongoing. There is also a real possibility 
that competitive dynamics—if taken too far—may start 
to damage brands which the V&TCs have begun to 
build within the international humanitarian system.
 
 
 
The conflict over how entry into humanitarian response 
is changing the nature of V&TCs is one to watch closely. 
Like Wikipedia, the software in V&TCs is created by a 
community and the value is often less in the code than 
in the knowledge that the code enables thousands 
of users to co-create. As a result, it can be difficult to 
separate the platform from the people who build knowl-
edge on top of those software tools. Likewise, software 
itself regulates what a person can and cannot do within 
the community. When crisis responders ask for (or 
themselves build) new features, they are also asking 
the community to change the range of possible behav-
iors that users perform in the software, which is roughly 
analogous to asking for a change to law or policy in 
a real-world town or city. Whose software code gets 
used—a crisis responder’s or a technologist’s who 
wishes to see the software remain focused on its origi-
nal, far-more-general mission—is sometimes a matter 
of choosing which policy is the law of the land. 9
I think the crisis mapping community is successful in what they 
do because they are who they are. And the UN system brings to 
crisis a rigor that the crisis mapping community does not have. 
And importantly, the UN has been there for far longer and far more 
crises than the crisis community even is interested in. And so it’s a 
mutual respect for each other’s work I think that will be the founda-
tion to move forward. And hopefully this will occur. 
–Sanjana Hattotuwa, ICT4Peace Foundation
David (Spackman) was our operation founder. He had been in an 
infantry officer in the British army, and he had an absolutely rigor-
ous approach. It was almost a joke, we were so military in the way 
we went about things. We were so structured and so disciplined. 
It was important to know that we were never a volunteer network. 
Rather, we were an organization from day one, and people were 
hired as volunteers to fill specific roles as a team with jobs to do. 
It was approached in a totally structured way and it was top down. 
We had a group that got together to discuss ways and means of 
doing things. But once we decide how we were going to do it, we 
pretty much dictated to the team: This is how we are going to do 
it.      –Nigel Woof, MapAction
 
Unlike other VTCs which can bend rules because they are ori-
ented toward humanitarian operations, OSM is oriented to building 
a fully open map of the world, and must therefore ensure that data 
that get input into the map has clear licensing. This perspective 
makes OSM more purist than other VTCs.      –Kate Chapman, 
Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team
Credit: UN Foundation Photo/D. Evans
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Some V&TCs believe in the potential of technology to 
change slower-moving enterprises. Many have lived 
through the Internet revolution, having built companies 
that succeeded at changing the way that the general 
public perceives of problems in imagery, mapping, 
GIS, and crowdsourcing. For some, this success fuels 
a belief that technology is itself a driver of change, 
rather than one of several enabling factors that leaders 
can channel to transform organizations. Large en-
terprises move on slower timescales because their 
solutions generally need to be rolled out to thousands 
of employees. These institutions need to account for 
a huge range of organizational requirements and to 
implement accountability controls to ensure compli- 
ance with international agreements and internal 
processes and policies. 
Many V&TCs have little experience with working on 
megadisasters. V&TCs are instead accustomed to 
shaping malleable architectures of software code. 
While some have deployed to the field, they tend 
to tackle information management challenges that 
allow for rapid cycle development of software. Most 
are accustomed to working with data whose acciden-
tal release would not put vulnerable populations at risk 
(though some do have methods for dealing with these 
issues, especially those V&TCs that work in human 
rights). While some of their leaders are experienced 
hands in international development, the organizations 
are generally are too young to be acquainted with how 
programmatic choices early in the response lead to 
reconstruction and development outcomes years in 
the future. The scale of these decisions is many orders 
of magnitude beyond what V&TCs generally confront.
 
Open Standards
The most successful integration of tools and data from 
V&TCs happened in the areas where the internation-
al humanitarian system has adopted the most open 
standards: geospatial data. Many GIS officers and 
V&TCs were using applications that supported Open 
Geospatial Consortium standards like WMS (web map-
ping service) and WFS (web feature service). As a re-
sult, many information systems were able to exchange 
critical geospatial information using reliable, consistent 
formats. For instance, an OpenStreetMap GIS analyst 
could point her application to the output of an IOM ana-
lyst’s service, integrating traces of the changing outer 
boundaries of IDP camps (polygons). In turn, a third 
analyst from WFP could point his tools to the output 
of both the IOM and OpenStreetMap and obtain street 
level data around those IDP camps.
That said, for all the years of hard work that went into 
making this data exchange possible, this intermeshed 
network of geospatial applications is still very rough. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is still no 
agreement on a data dictionary that specifies how 
each discrete object in a response—such as a water 
bladder—should be described within the Common 
Operational Dataset (capacity, location, etc.). While it is 
possible to exchange base-level mapping data without 
a data dictionary, it is not possible to exchange opera-
tional data about objects and events—a situation con-
firmed by the UN CITO office’s analysis of applications 
across the clusters as well as by on-the-ground reports 
from GIS officers.
The Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team devised a 
basic method for making these data available to cluster 
officials with whom it worked. Dubbed the Humanitar-
ian Data Model, it provides a basic means of mapping 
concepts across clusters using points of interest in the 
OpenStreetMap database. It is an initiative worthy of 
further discussion, especially since the most common 
GIS analysis tool in the field—ESRI ArcGIS—has 
begun to support reading and writing to the Open-
StreetMap in its new ArcGIS 10 platform, though 
Credit: UN/MINUSTAH/Logan Abassi
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additional work would be necessary to also support the 
Humanitarian Data Model in ESRI software.
 
 
Verifiability
Geodata has largely gained the trust of field staff in cer-
tain clusters as well as key policy makers and advisors. 
Geodata tends to be verifiable to the laymen’s eyes, 
because its accuracy can be ascertained by walking 
to the place and checking the data by eye. While pro-
cesses around the creation and use of Geodata need 
to be formalized, it is likely that volunteered geographic 
information will be used as much as volunteered infor-
mation on trusted wikis (like Wikipedia). OpenStreet-
Map will be commonly understood to be the Wikipedia 
of maps.
 
 
On the other hand, data submitted by the affected 
population and processed by crowdsourcing V&TCs 
is the subject of fierce debate. Among members of 
organizations involved in traditional survey-based 
assessments, there is a criticism that the data that some 
crowdsourcing V&TCs generated from SMS reports 
were not collected according to tested processes; 
instead, collection was done from samples which are 
unlikely to be representative and may have self-selec-
tion bias. USAR teams found that a high proportion 
of SMS reports about entrapments turned out to be 
false leads. Many were sent by families who wished to 
recover a body of a person that was known to be dead. 
 
 
However, crowdsourcing V&TCs are not claiming 
that this data is comprehensive or statistically valid; 
they are pointing to SMS reports as sensors that give 
testimony—which provide data about where a more 
traditional survey team might allocate scarce resourc-
es for certain types of problems. This tension is unre-
solved and will require much further dialogue.
 
The Need for an Interface
To open their information flows into the international 
humanitarian system, V&TCs will have to build and 
demonstrate reliable and consistent capabilities. The 
international humanitarian system will also need to 
adapt to different methods of work based on open 
standards and web services, and will need to establish 
agreements with V&TCs to aggregate and analyze re-
ports from individual voices that emerge from disaster 
affected communities. 
 
While it is true that V&TC solutions are able to interoper-
ate because they use open data standards and public 
interfaces (APIs), open data is itself a technical solution 
to the problem of transparency. V&TCs tend to believe 
that by making both data and decision making pro-
cesses entirely open, better solutions and governance 
emerges at all levels. 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Helping 
non-technologists to understand this concept of an API 
usually requires metaphors. To that end, think of APIs 
as a protocol by which two or more organizations can 
exchange information. Some organizations only allow 
certain types of requests to arrive on specified paper 
forms (like a request for reimbursement of travel costs). 
Likewise, they only allow certain types of information to 
leave the organization on specified forms (like a check). 
APIs perform a similar role for data. Through software 
that runs on public web sites (called services), APIs 
handle requests for data. They require these requests to 
be in specified formats, and then serve data back out in 
specified formats. Mashups require software that have 
two attributes: a published data schema that abides 
by open standards; and an application programming 
interface (API) by which external organizations can read 
(and often write) data to/from the service. 
We ought to agree on architecture, standards, and protocols. It 
should be possible to say to organizations when they arrive, ‘you 
are not playing unless you are playing according to this architec-
ture, standards, and protocols. Use any software you want, as 
long as it conforms to these standards.’ The UN could use its bully 
pulpit role to enforce that. Otherwise you get the same wonderful 
people who do the best they can with the electronic equivalent of 
duct tape. It’s absurd to keep doing it over and over. 
–David Aylward
I would trust OpenStreetMap. Period.   –Sanjana Hattotuwa, 
ICT for Peace Foundation
Overall 70% of the information that came in about people being 
trapped was unreliable. Many people fully understand that their 
family members are dead, but want us [USAR teams] to come to 
bring out the bodies.      –Ramiro Galvez, UNDAC
A lot of these NGOs are being created because we have failed as a 
community to portray the situation on the ground to the rest of the 
“
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world. These new players feel they need to provide the informa-
tion. There are a lot of gaps in what we are doing and we should 
get these new NGOs to focus on these gaps instead of duplicating 
what we are already doing.      –Ramiro Galvez, UNDAC
 
Information sharing and integration across clusters 
will require open data exchanged over open interfac-
es using open data schema. The system has already 
stepped in this direction. The question is how to foster 
further work that integrates new voices and new oppor-
tunities into the system.
  
 
 
To this end, it is important to realize that the interna-
tional humanitarian system and V&TCs have significant 
differences in culture, mindset, and approach. The two 
communities also have important overlaps, with key 
individuals serving as bridges between problems in the 
field and capabilities in the cloud. Connecting V&TCs 
into the international humanitarian system will require 
careful consideration not only of tools and practices 
but also of underlying beliefs, including how those 
beliefs align and how they conflict.
Some of problems that need to be solved form the sub-
ject of the next chapter.
I really think that there is no other way than to keep working to-
gether in order to improve the way the affected populations share 
and communicate emergency information. The people will share 
information no matter if the process will be managed or not. Same 
as people share information about what they had for lunch, they 
will share information during crisis. We as a community have a 
unique opportunity to step in to the process, if not as manag-
ers, than definitely as facilitators who can help to translate these 
conversations into something the responders (no matter if inter-
national or local) can understand. I am not saying that we have all 
the know-how at hand right now, but we started the process, we 
learned and we have ideas how to make it more solid. 
–Jaroslav Varuch, Ushahidi
Credit: Télécom Sans Frontières
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INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
Interviewees expressed strong support for integration 
of technical capabilities to create more efficient infor-
mation flows. An ‘API for the UN’ was a topic of discus-
sion at the 2010 Crisis Mappers conference in Boston, 
with the core notion being that the UN should partner 
with the V&TCs to establish a common set of protocols 
to connect their people, workflows, and data flows. 
The ICT4Peace Foundation heard this appeal and 
integrated the concept into its recommendations for 
the UN CITO’s Crisis Information Management ini-
tiative. 10 What remains, however, is to design the in-
terface itself. These next two chapters offer a first 
formulation of the idea.
The design is based on a synthesis of previous lessons 
learned about connecting the V&TCs into formal orga-
nizations, including prior work by:
÷ UN OCHA Columbia
÷ iHub (Kenya)
÷ UN Global Pulse
÷ MapAction
÷ UNICEF Innovation Unit
÷ InSTEDD Innovation Lab (Cambodia)
÷ Strong Angel Disaster Response 
÷ Demostrations
÷ Crisis Mappers Stand-By Task Force
05
A partnership between the formal humanitarian community 
and the informal V&TCs requires an interface between the 
two systems—a set of protocols not only governing flows 
of data but also different ways of thinking about decision 
making, problem solving, and conflict resolution. This in-
terface should be designed to work during a humanitarian 
emergency as well as during the transitions from prepara-
tion to response and response to recovery. To aid adoption, 
the interface must start and remain lightweight, simple, and 
adaptable.
Credit: FAO/Truls Brekke, MapAction, Nigel Snoad
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It is the hope of the partners in this report—OCHA, the 
UN Foundation and Vodafone Foundation Technology 
Partnership, and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative—
that this outline will initiate a conversation with a larger 
group of stakeholders than could be interviewed in the 
scoping phase of the project.
 
FORMULATING THE DESIGN CHALLENGES
Designs succeed based on the questions they ask and 
answer. In this case, the first and most important is: 
what framework will allow multiple communities—each 
with its own understanding of humanitarian work—to 
learn from each other, gradually build trust though col-
laboration on shared problems, and find ways to act in 
concert? This type of problem—one where communi-
ties engage in learning and coordination over multiple 
cycles—tends to be best met by systems thinking, 
which uses feedback loops to map out interactions 
over time. 11
 
 
 
Adopting the approach begins by mapping out the key 
interactions in a system. For the interface between the 
V&TCs and the formal humanitarian communities, six 
core tasks are coming into focus:
1. Identifying common problems: Key stakeholders 
in the humanitarian system wish to engage in dialogue 
to discover areas where values and practices are in 
alignment and conflict. Participants will need to work 
though a neutral forum to discuss gaps in the cur-
rent processes and devise methods to address those 
gaps, including major rethinking of underlying pro-
cesses and workflows. This thinking includes ethical 
Many of these initiatives share a common practice: they 
approach the integration of V&TCs with formal humani-
tarian organizations as a design problem. That is, they 
build systems that capture in their designs how each 
type of user approaches different tasks and plans for 
how those users interact. They also accept as a core 
truth that systems must adapt to changing circum-
stances, including changing patterns of use and new 
external challenges. 
This report seeks to take a similar approach. It has its 
own set of assumptions, which balance several ideas 
and keep them in creative tension:
1.  To be honest to the practical constraints while 
also ensuring that the initiative will challenge the 
status quo.
2.  To acknowledge that part of the problem is tech-
nical but focus the supermajority of effort on adapt-
ing practices and policies to a new emerging set of 
realities and expectations.
3.  To reduce the complexity of the problem into 
manageable bits without diluting the message and 
losing its connection to ground truth.
The extent to which this first formulation succeeds is 
due to the patience and openness of our interviewees. 
What follows is a proposed framework for an interface 
between V&TCs and the formal humanitarian commu-
nity put in two parts: 
1.  Chapter 4: Interface Requirements. A formula-
tion of design problems that need to be solved based 
on the analysis in Chapter 3; and
2.  Chapter 5: Organizational Design. A proposed 
organizational design that meets most of these 
design challenges from Chapter 4.
So it’s more about having appropriate processes that can harness 
the capacity of ICT, of making sure human resources have the 
appropriate competencies, that they’re aware of how to use tech-
nology, and how it can play an important role. And I think if people 
keep jumping to the tool or the technology as the solution, we will 
not move forward.     –Brendan McDonald, OCHA
“
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questions about the application of any solution—
which will always be a combination of technology, 
people, and practices—to situations where lives are 
at risk.
2. Innovating through field experimentation: 
Cross-functional teams composed of experts and 
technologists from the formal and informal humani-
tarian community have been collaborating on tan-
gible, simple, practical approaches to close gaps 
identified by stakeholders and reinvent processes 
(including work through the relief experiments at 
Camp Roberts, Strong Angel, and classes at the 
Parsons School of Design and NYU ITP, like Clay 
Shirky’s Design for UNICEF class and the humanitar-
ian information design class at the Parsons School 
of Design). Working with UN and NGO field staff and 
developers from the developing world, innovation 
teams co-develop the solutions in the field, partner-
ing with the personnel who need to make more in-
formed decisions. This field-testing alternates with 
development in an iterative cycle akin to Agile soft-
ware development techniques.
3. Cross-training personnel in tools and prac-
tices from the formal and informal humanitarian 
systems: This effort would enlarge a growing con-
sortium of educational institutions that are already 
training humanitarian personnel. The effort would 
work with the institutions to offer curricula for 1) 
V&TCs to learn the practices and history of the formal 
humanitarian community, and 2) the UN and NGO 
personnel to learn how to apply new (and newly de-
veloped) tools to their work. This work has begun at a 
crisis mapping program at Tufts University and at the 
Harvard-Tufts-MIT Humanitarian Studies Initiative.
4. Deploying a coordination cell. This activity 
would pull cross-trained staff from the formal and 
informal communities into a coordination cell that can 
deploy to emergencies, providing both field-based 
support and reach-back support from major centers 
of activity. The team would focus on synthesizing 
information from narrative reports, crowdsourcing, 
and structured data feeds into a composite picture 
of the emergency for decision makers. They would 
include translators and (where possible) a coordina-
tor who mobilizes the diaspora community and other 
civil society organizations from the affected region. 
5. Integrating tools and practices into formal 
policy: A policy officer is formally tasked with coor-
dinating the policy aspects of the entire enterprise: 
forum, field experimentation, coordination cell, train-
ing, and evaluation. The officer would work with the 
experimentation team to identify experts from across 
the formal and informal humanitarian system with the 
goals of 1) aligning data standards with the Common 
Operational Dataset; 2) ensuring that all solutions 
enable the construction of a common operational 
picture and facilitate more effective decision making; 
and 3) ensuring that training is enabling field staff to 
learn and extend these tools and practices to their 
own ends. This officer also works to integrate V&TCs 
into the funding cycles for appeals and build policy 
to allow for funding vehicles to reach small but high 
ROI efforts from V&TCs.
6. Evaluating the results: A consortium of academics, 
donors, beneficiaries, and members from the formal 
and informal humanitarian communities monitors 
the entire system and reports on areas of success 
and shortcoming. This consortium establishes a safe 
forum to discuss failures and the lessons that were 
learned from the initiative which failed at any stage 
of its development, from conception to deployment.
These six elements can be placed into a feedback 
loop, that shows how creating learning opportunities 
between V&TCs and the formal humanitarian commu-
nity can lead to a virtuous circle, improving outcomes 
through all stages of the cycle: 
 
 
Experiment & Innovate Train
Deploy
Evaluate & Research
Discuss &
Identify Problems
Integrate with Policy
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PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED
Based on research on the information management 
challenges in Haiti and on the current tensions be-
tween the international humanitarian system and the 
V&TCs, there are several categories of problems that 
should be tackled:
÷ Data Standards and Quality
÷ Workflows to Support Decisions
÷ Professionalization
÷ Experimentation
÷ Education and Training
 
Data Standards and Flows 
Implementation of the Common Operational Da-
taset (COD). 12 There are three issues emerging from 
research on the COD: 1) How to ensure integration of 
information systems that the clusters and V&TCs are 
using with the various data standards specified in the 
COD; 2) How to establish which organizations maintain 
which data sets, including the specification of a set of 
tools, practices, and policies that allow for interoper-
able data flows within the cluster system; and 3) How to 
describe the specific data objects that are referenced 
within the COD. The third issue was problematic in Haiti.
 
 
 
 
 
Unstructured Data and Structured Data Feeds. Man-
aging the flow of critical operational data elements by 
sharing unstructured data such as situation reports, 
slides, emails, and SMS messages leads to a number 
of problems, including information overload and diffi-
culties in isolating trends. Critical data elements and 
indicators of the humanitarian situation can currently 
only be found if a human reads a document and types 
an attribute of interest into a spreadsheet of database. 
Work on this problem should focus on characterizing 
data by location and thereby making them discoverable 
through maps, spreadsheets, and database reports.
APIs and Open Data Services. If the clusters are go-
ing to coordinate activity more effectively, they will all 
need to use published, open data schema to describe 
activities and assets in the field and to make the under-
lying data available within these schema using open 
application programming interfaces. These interfaces 
or APIs will enable field staff to subscribe to services 
that provide them with status information about WASH, 
Camp Management, Health, and other sectors for any 
given location, providing the basis for a shared picture 
of the problems and needs for any given place. With-
out an API and open data, the system will continue to 
struggle to pull together a common operational picture, 
and managers will continue to be frustrated with how 
little they know early in an operation.
 
 
Simplified Early Assessments. As part of ongoing 
work to develop global standards for needs assess-
ments 13, the top 100 indicators might be reduced to 
an even more lightweight set of simplified metrics for 
use by V&TCs during the first 72 hours of the response. 
These simple metrics could be collected by both 
informal and formal communities through all possible 
channels, including crowdsourcing. V&TCs might also 
explore the use of automated statistical methods to 
determine if the dynamics of the current crisis might 
match patterns from previous deployments.
As the Secretary-General said at a recent UN Global Pulse event: 
‘in order to answer problems of global scale, you need solutions 
that span the globe as well.’ With an interconnected world, you’ll 
see an ability to have volunteerism at a scale that didn’t exist 
before. One of the things that Clay Shirky often says is that ‘the 
only thing that scales to the number of people in the world is the 
number of people in the world.’ There is now a chance to really 
build some strong scaling, open-source solutions. 
–Chris Fabian, UNICEF
 
“
” 
…the common operation data set is something which is very im-
portant… but when the operational data set is not encompassing 
the WATSAN objects, how are you going to describe your water or 
how are you going to describe your pumps and how are you going 
to describe each and each of the features that you need to have to 
describe when you operate in WASH?      –Former UNDP field worker
Credit: OCHA/ Dan DeLorenzo
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Verification and Validation of Citizen-generated 
Information (Crowdsourcing): Some USAR teams 
found that the accuracy of information generated from 
crowdsourcing platforms was often low; sometimes 
less than a third turned out to be accurate. The ten-
dency of citizens to exaggerate under extreme stress 
should not be underestimated, nor should the potential 
service that crowdsourcing will serve in future opera-
tions as citizens learn how to use social media. For this 
reason, humanitarian communities need to develop 
methods for the application of crowdsourcing, includ-
ing verifying and validating information that has been 
generated by citizens within the affected area as well 
as by volunteers from around the world. 
 
Designing the Role of Field Troubleshooter. Five 
interviewees performed a critical role during the re-
sponse: they walked tent to tent, asking cluster staff 
what their problems and gaps were, and then matched 
those information needs against resources. In some 
cases, troubleshooters outsourced the problems to 
networks of experts in Crisis Mappers or OpenStreet-
Map. In others, they asked reach-back teams from their 
own organizations to perform the work. In one case, 
the solution generated created a program which exists 
at IOM to this day. However, research revealed that the 
departure of these troubleshooters was very disruptive, 
sometimes putting a stop to positive dynamics that had 
only just started. There is a desire to explore how to 
formalize the role of troubleshooter, so that this func-
tion can foster cross-cluster information sharing and 
enable the gradual construction of a common opera-
tional picture.
Workflows
Fragmentation of Information Flows and Systems. 
Interviewees expressed strong worries about the frag-
mentation of crisis information management systems. 
In the field and headquarters, it was impossible to syn-
thesize data from diverse workflows for each cluster 
and sub-cluster into a composite picture that facilitated 
decision making. That said, division of information into 
functional silos is not itself the root cause of the frag-
mentation problem. Rather, it is an expression of the 
dominant analytical methods of the present age, which 
divides complex problems into ever smaller parts, in 
the belief that validity of each well-crafted answer to 
small puzzles creates—like assembled bricks—a com-
posite edifice of understanding of the whole. In crises, 
however, there is no mechanism to collate all the bricks 
into one place, and no information masons whose job 
it is to build a shared structure.14 As more information 
flows through humanitarian operations, the success of 
the cluster system relies on its ability to synthesize the 
insights of each stakeholder into a composite view of 
a dynamic situation. It was a common theme that this 
process will derive from the application of simple, light-
weight frameworks (described further below). Frag-
mentation is a design challenge of deep importance.
It can be used as a communications channel to give some sort of 
dialogue between three main actors—the humanizing community, 
the public authorities, and the population.    –Kurt Jean Charles, 
noula.ht
“
” 
To have a fixer wandering around the grasslands with a number 
of different vocabularies was incredibly valuable. Someone who 
could walk into a tent and ask: ‘Tell me what it is that you can’t do 
today.’ I played this role in Haiti. When I went into the hospital, as a 
physician, I heard that they needed lactated ringers. So I called the 
hospital ship and got a pallet of what they needed. Having these 
informal fixers is cheap and easy. They can calm people down, 
help them see other points of view, get to the root of the problem, 
and fix it. There is no one who currently has this as an assigned 
task.      –Eric Rasmussen, MD MDM, InSTEDD
 
“
” 
I’m a firm believer in the ability of the right technologies to enhance 
our decision making and information sharing abilities. That’s shar-
ing internally and also with affected populations about the situa-
tion and about priorities and so forth. That only, only ever works if 
a) they’re simple enough, and b) that the processes to make them 
standardized and repeatable exist.     –Nigel Snoad, UNDAC
“
” 
Credit: Andrej Verity
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Shared Situational Awareness: The aggregation of 
information from many stakeholders and information 
types (geospatial, news feeds, structured data feeds, 
email) is impossible without open data and APIs. How-
ever, once these elements are in place, it will be pos-
sible to pull data together into a composite information 
fusion that can be visualized in multiple ways. This 
fusion also opens another possibility: the analysis of 
patterns, trends, and problems based on lessons from 
previous emergencies. Among UN staff, there was a 
growing interest in exploring the creation of an informa-
tion management cluster to perform this role, perhaps 
with an NGO-analogue to MapAction to perform visual-
ization and analysis.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Microtasking with Audit and Task Tracking. This 
effort would explore the application of microtasking 
to outsourcing menial tasks that consume massive 
amounts of field staff time to offsite locations, where 
crowds could perform the work and send the results 
back to the field. Microtasking is a type of crowdsourc-
ing that divides a large effort into discrete, small tasks 
that generally take only a few minutes each to complete. 
When spread over a large number of people—often 
dozens or even hundreds—the task can be completed 
with many microtasks moving in parallel. This process 
is akin to parallel supercomputing but using humans 
as processors. It is particularly suited to tasks like tran-
scribing written contacts lists into spreadsheets, geo-
locating objects in a spreadsheet, and translating short 
items like SMS messages. The effort requires some 
degree of auditing to ensure that each task is accurately 
performed and some degree of tracking to ensure that 
no task is performed more times than is necessary to 
ensure accuracy. 
 
Closing the Decision-Data Cycle: The integration of 
data flows into UN decision making processes is itself 
a work in process. This effort would seek to better link 
the financial appeals cycle with information collection 
and analysis and would benefit from close coopera-
tion between donors, V&TCs, and agencies with formal 
mandates under the IASC Needs Assessment Working 
Group. One type of success would be to connect all 
stakeholders into a common information flow: from 
donor to beneficiary and back. 
 
There is a very good argument for an information management 
cluster or whatever it gets called. There has been an explosion of 
actors in that sphere in the last couple of years and I don’t think it 
is realistic to expect a kind of lead dog to emerge from within that 
sector whom everybody in the sector will agree to be coordinated 
by. So I think the only way to coordinate is to have a cluster-like 
approach, for all its probable agonies.       –Nigel Woof, MapAction
“
” 
Microtasking is a great way of addressing large volumes of in-
formation on short notice.     –Rob Munro, 4636 Alliance and 
Stanford University
“
” 
We heard about people in the field who ended up staying up all 
night doing data entry, because they did not have back office sup-
port in their own organization and they did not have an agreement 
with someone else to do their work for them. It was incredibly 
frustrating to be at the other end, knowing that we could have 
helped. Why is someone staying up to 3AM in Port au Prince 
typing contact lists?      –Mark Prutsalis, Sahana Foundation
“
” 
It would be great to have some of the feedback loop closed where 
we could know where to funnel the information of the kinds of 
information that specific actors on the ground want. 
–Jen Ziemke, CrisisMappers
“
” 
Credit: Nigel Snoad
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Professionalization
Humanitarian Principles and Code of Conduct: 
Interviewees expressed deep concern about ensur-
ing that new players in the humanitarian space abide 
by humanitarian principles, particularly through the 
protection of information that contains details about 
specific individuals in the affected population (not to 
mention personally identifiable information about indi-
vidual responders). One proposal is the development 
of a Code of Conduct governing the actions of mem-
bers of the V&TCs. The formalization of this Code of 
Conduct is an area in which the UN and Red Cross can 
provide guidance.
Capacity Building: One expectation that the formal 
humanitarian organizations have of new actors from 
the V&TCs is that they will conform to existing rules 
on contracting, accountability, and ethics. New ac-
tors must be reliable and consistent. That said, many 
in the V&TCs admitted that they are still developing 
their financial and governance structures to enable this 
reliability. Some are honest about the still uncertain 
dynamics by which they are able to generate a surge 
of volunteers. One area of work therefore needs to be 
building capacity in the V&TCs. It may be prudent to 
hold a gathering of contracting officers, financial offi-
cers, design, monitoring and evaluation (DM&E) staff, 
and information management officers (IMOs) to work 
with leaders from the V&TCs. This working group could 
educate V&TCs about what processes would make it 
easier to participate in the formal response. It would 
also help younger V&TCs to find alternative arrange-
ments for funding, such as working underneath anoth-
er trusted entity. The capacity building can also work in 
the other direction. Large institutions tend to be unable 
to adapt quickly to circumstances that are not in their 
plans and systems. It should be possible to harness 
the energy and speed of development in the humani-
tarian free and open source software (HFOSS) com-
munities to create flexible, simple tools for the clusters 
at relatively low cost. Such work might occur in part-
nership with existing efforts, including work under UN 
Global Pulse and the UNICEF Innovation Unit.
 
 
Service Level Agreements: In the past, establishing 
reliable, predictable services from V&TCs has taken the 
form of service level agreements between large insti-
tutions and organizations that rely on volunteers. While 
such agreements are already in place with NGOs, like 
MapAction, the application of service level agreements to 
private volunteer organizations needs further exploration.
 
It might best be used to guarantee reach back support 
for menial tasks that are best outsourced from fielded 
staff. It is important that any service level agreements 
specify some level of project management and track-
ing around what the V&TCs are doing.
De Tocqueville wrote, “In democratic countries, knowl-
edge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms 
of knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the 
others.” 15
Using incoming social data for real time visualization and situ-
ational awareness is a culture shift for organizations like the Red 
Cross and FEMA. These tools not only allow us to anticipate needs 
better, they may also increase efficiency. For example, damage 
assessment is a time-consuming process in every response. 
We’re now looking at ways we might hand over that responsibility 
to neighbors with digital cameras and SMS capability. 
–Wendy Harman, American Red Cross
“
” 
Sustaining a volunteer effort is extremely difficult. This was as big 
and bad a disaster as you could imagine. But beyond 2–3 weeks, 
most volunteers need to go back to their jobs, their spouses, and 
their kids. Sustainability was an issue. Partnership agreements 
that can guarantee support and service can help address this 
problem.      –Mark Prutsalis, Sahana Foundation
“
” 
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These are tools that need to be in the hands of practitioners long 
before something like this happens. It’s very hard when we know 
coming into something like Haiti that we should not really advo-
cate dropping what you are doing and trying to learn a new tool. 
But at the same time, seeing that there are tools that can really do 
the job better, it is hard to know what is appropriate to inject as a 
new thing to the folks in the field versus how much do you need 
to stay out of the picture.      –David Bitner, Sahana Foundation
 
 
Competition and Collaboration. In the V&TCs, com-
petition has emerged as a disruptive dynamic. Commu-
nities that need each other’s strengths are being force 
to compete for money in the donor pool, and some are 
finding the need to compete in areas of overlap or are 
being asked to tackle issues where other V&TCs are 
already working. Some competition is good; but coor-
dination of effort needs to be put in place so that scarce 
resources are not wasted on work which is already 
complete or better done by other organizations.
Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities.
The Communicating with Disaster-Affected Commu-
nities network brings together leading relief, develop-
ment, and media development agencies in a collabo-
ration that recognizes information sharing as a key 
humanitarian deliverable. The network seeks to identify 
and promote best practice in communicating with 
disaster-affected populations, with a view to helping 
to save lives and reduce vulnerability. CDAC member 
agencies are collectively working to reach out to aid 
agencies to help them improve the way they commu-
nicate with affected populations. Members document 
examples of best practice, collect data from monitoring 
and evaluation exercises, and explore how new tech-
nology can improve information exchange. In response 
to select emergencies, CDAC member agencies work 
together in-country to improve communication with 
affected populations. In Haiti, CDAC was funded to pro-
vide a coordinated service to disseminate life-saving 
information. It operated as the “Communications Sub-
Group” within the UN Cluster System. Its exploration 
of the value of new technology was limited; more work 
needs to be done in this field.
Education and Training
Training curriculum. Ensuring a common approach 
to IM problems in the field will require some method 
of training (and cross-training) field staff in the various 
data collection and analysis methods that various clus-
ters and V&TCs use. OCHA already is having difficulty 
finding and hiring such field staff. Other personnel from 
organizations that are formally part of the international 
humanitarian system also should receive training in a 
common set of IM tasks specific to their work as well as 
in methods that V&TCs are developing to complement 
cluster-level IM workflows. Training for the informal 
community would provide volunteers and technolo-
gists with a history of humanitarian operations, includ-
ing why certain policies about clusters, protection, and 
humanitarian principles have come into being. It would 
also ensure technology is in the hands of practitioners 
before the disaster.
I think the key will be to make sure that a core group is enabled 
and empowered to pick up the slack when the emergency hits both 
in terms of guaranteeing the service level response—almost like 
a service agreement. There would be a certain minimal level of 
response that the practitioners could draw on. I’m not talking 
about extensive contract documents here, but that there would 
be fairly clear understandings on both sides about what you could 
expect from both sides.      –Paul Currion
“
” 
The humanitarian community has training in logistics, nutri-
tion, water & sanitation, and security procedures. But it has not 
really developed a curriculum for information management and 
information & communication technology.     –Dennis King, U.S. 
Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit
“
” 
“
” 
Credit: Andrej Verity
52
the less it becomes about the people and the more it becomes 
about the numbers.      –Paul Currion
Simulations and Complex Field Experiments: In 
music, though a performance is the “event”, most of 
the real work happens in rehearsal; the performance is 
a process that flows from prior difficult conversations 
and serious play. Those who expect a practice session 
to go perfectly are not actually rehearsing; they are just 
running through a composition and therefore learning 
only a fraction what is possible to discover. Musicians 
who engage deep inquiry tend to experiment openly 
and try ideas that they initially dislike. Humanitarian 
operations lack these types of spaces, where practi-
tioners from different backgrounds and affiliations can 
practice both how information flows between organi-
zations. There are currently few ways to explore how 
V&TCs can augment the capacities of larger institu-
tions. Simulations can help with this process, but these 
events tend to incorporate evaluation into their rubrics; 
it is hard to try new ideas when one is being rated for 
one’s competency. There must be a place to experi-
ment and fail. There is also a need for a space where 
practitioners can explore new functionality that they 
have wanted to create but never get time to pursue. 
These spaces might well take the form of existing field 
experiments that were pioneered through the Strong 
Angel series.
 
 
Finding Balance between Science and the Art of 
Humanitarianism. There is a tension in the humanitar-
ian community on what should drive decision making: 
compelling narratives or trending numbers. Traditional 
views of the scientific method are largely predicated on 
a notion that one can only know what one can mea-
sure. As a result, a tendency to rely on hard data is 
deeply embedded in humanitarian practice, especially 
evidence-based assessments. That said, there is worry 
that in the numbers, there is a loss of focus on the 
people and the parts of humanitarian emergencies 
which cannot be measured. As Paul Currion put it, 
 
With the rise of powerful ways for affected communi-
ties to voice their stories, and with the advent of new 
tools to turn these stories into statistics, the balance 
between the two sides requires further exploration.
Identifying interface problems at each level of 
interconnection. While all stakeholders wish to change 
the realities for affected populations, the traditional hu-
manitarian communities and V&TCs each have different 
visions for how this work should happen. One will tend 
to work as an enterprise: slowly towards consensus of 
many agencies. The other will progress with many ex-
periments, most of which will fail before they reach the 
field. Efforts toward some synthesis must start by ex-
ploring the perspectives of all stakeholders, account-
ing for the ways that everyone from senior leaders to 
illiterate farmers will use information flows to make de-
cisions. There may be multiple answers, which need 
not be reduced to lowest common denominators, but 
each explored in parallel and held in creative tension. 
The threats from these new technologies are what you would find 
with any new technology or new intervention. The biggest threat is 
not being open about failure and not being open about what works 
and what doesn’t. The second is siloing work and developing par-
allel systems to perform similar tasks in different verticals. It’s a 
problem that be avoided through open source and open communi-
ties, but is always a danger.      –Chris Fabian, UNICEF
“
“
” 
” 
I am a big fan of making decisions based on data. And I still am, 
but the problem is the more that you emphasize evidence as 
being the primary vector—the primary factor in your thinking—
Credit: IRIN
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Experimentation
The exploration of tangible collaborations across 
clusters. Humanitarians need to explore how integrated 
information systems could provide decision makers 
with a composite picture of the unfolding emergency. 
If information could flow across clusters and V&TCs, it 
might be possible to understand how to plan for mass 
movements of refugees as a collaborative endeavor, 
capturing the links between logistics, water, sanitation, 
health, and shelters and connecting to leaders in the 
affected population.
Establishing a framework for performing field 
experiments. Mimicking the success of the work of 
InSTEDD’s Innovation Labs and the plans for similar 
sites for UN Global Pulse, a working group would find 
ways to engage local actors from field offices in the 
identification of problems and development of solu-
tions in situ. This endeavor would take developers 
out of the office and bring them into the field, where 
the challenges of austere conditions will drive them 
to adopt simplified solutions that work in real-world 
environments.
Simple, Lightweight Processes that Enable Learn-
ing in Real Time: Large institutions tend to be unable 
to adapt their processes in real time to meet the chal-
lenges of each unique disaster. Instead, big organi-
zations try to develop comprehensive processes that 
cover most known contingencies. This approach may 
be accurate and low risk, but it is slow and sometimes 
cannot adapt to new dynamics that challenge the 
underlying assumptions of the processes humanitar-
ians should work on developing design protocols that 
are aligned with systems that V&TCs are using, which 
tend to be relatively simple to implement, at least com-
pared to most traditional technologies for coordination 
and electronic data exchange, and have compara-
tively lightweight requirements around data standards. 
Simpler is faster and more accurate in the chaos of 
the disaster; it is also more adaptable. That said, new 
methods around iterative learning would need to be 
adapted for larger organizations, which would entail 
working with significant cultural challenges. 
SUMMARY
These design challenges are but a subset of the 
issues to be confronted by the community. The 
authors hope that they provide a useful starting point 
for discussions, and that they spark considerable 
debate. The organizational design for this ongoing 
dialogue is the subject of the next chapter.
Credit: IRIN
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06
ORGANIZATIONAL
DESIGN FOR AN INTERFACE 
 
Translating the six-element feedback loop from Chapter 
4 into a practical system of V&TCs and humanitarian 
institutions requires a healthy dose of pragmatism. 
Interviewees said that an overstretched humanitarian 
staff wants to integrate new activities into a common 
workflow. They also indicated that this efficiency would 
be important for putting limited funding for coordina-
tion work to best use. This design of such a common 
workflow is the subject of this chapter. 
The authors assumed that the most practical approach 
to this design challenge was to build off existing initia-
tives and to glue them together into a constellation of 
activities. The organizational design includes new ele-
ments only where necessary. It includes four elements: 
1. Humanitarian Technology Forum
2. Humanitarian Innovation Lab
3. Humanitarian Information Coordination Cell (HICC)
4. Humanitarian Research and Training  
 Consortium (HRTC) 
 
 
The development of an interface between the V&TCs and 
formal humanitarian system is a design problem that must 
be left to the stakeholders. This chapter provides a guide to 
one possible organization design for an interface that might 
enable V&TCs to complement and augment the operations of 
the international humanitarian system. It is simple, practical, 
and without assumption that large budgets are available (al-
though it is clear that new investments are needed). The de-
sign is optimized to enable continuous dialogue about and in-
novation to yield improved communications and information 
management between all stakeholders: donors, beneficiaries, 
V&TCs, NGOs, and UN agencies.
Credit: Government of Colombia, Nigel Snoad, Andrej Verity
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HUMANITARIAN TECHNOLOGY FORUM
The forum would be a neutral venue for surfacing shared 
problems between the VT&Cs and the international 
humanitarian communities, including member states 
whose work in humanitarian operations is expanding. 
Members would have space to review successes and 
failures and brainstorm possible solutions. Additionally, 
they could recommend further work on promising solu-
tions by members of the Lab and the academic com-
munity under the Humanitarian Research and Training 
Consortium. Additionally, the Forum would function as 
the primary mechanism for dispute resolution between 
the communities, and would be a place for the discus-
sion of the ethical and procedural issues that must 
remain in balance to pursue humanitarian ends. 
 
The need for a neutral space
This concept of a ‘neutral space’ or ‘holding environ-
ment’ is a core design element of many best practices 
in dialogue and change management. 16 Work that 
crosses organizations and specializations requires a 
safe space where those with different belief structures 
around the work can safely raise issues and explore 
alternative mindsets. The space should facilitate face-
to-face connections across organizational divides, 
enabling stakeholders to build relationships that are 
critical during field operations. This space should 
provide a forum for the discussion of how information 
management policy and ground truth interact. And it 
should be open to everyone from donors and benefi-
ciaries to technologists at operational organizations 
and the agencies that contract with them.
 
The Humanitarian Forum would rely on this best-prac-
tice design as a starting point. A professional facilitator 
should moderate this neutral space. He or she could 
focus the communities on their common work and help 
various factions (which may not map neatly onto or-
ganizations) to find ways to acknowledge differences 
and adapt to changing situations. Facilitation should 
gradually be handed over to the community itself as it 
develops its own leaders. 
The basic structure of this space would be the opposite 
of that found in most formal institutions: it would work 
by lightweight, largely informal processes—only as 
many rules as necessary to ensure focus on the work 
of bridging the communities and building common 
tools, practices, and policies. The internet engineering 
task force might be one model. The bylaws of the fo-
rum would contain clauses that enable the members to 
develop their organizational designs and processes to 
meet changing requirements, and ensure that the fo-
rum remains focused on what is simple and practical.
The Humanitarian Technology Forum should function 
as one of the primary means to engage in conflict reso-
lution between the international humanitarian commu-
nity and V&TCs. Through open dialogue, discussions 
could analyze the root causes of information manage-
ment challenges, while also making all parties aware of 
opportunities opened by new tools and practices.
The forum would also explore shared requirements 
and facilitate agreement on data standards and APIs. 
Through exploration of common technical problems, 
the Forum could agree to forward applied research 
questions to the Humanitarian Lab.
 
Meetings
The forum should be hosted at a neutral physical 
space and facilitated by moderators skilled in dialogue 
across organizations and cultures. The forum would 
It seems to me to be quite perfect that it’s that kind of community 
based approach that could be a good way of getting discussion 
going. And the discussion is what creates the basis for trust and 
the trust creates the possibility of working together for practical 
projects.      –Paul Currion
“
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hold an open face-to-face meeting once per quarter, 
focused on bringing together key stakeholders to dis-
cuss agenda items that the group sets in its yearly plan. 
The meetings would also enable members of the forum 
to add problems to its agenda based on the unfold-
ing process of discovery. It would also hold a larger 
annual meeting, the goal of which would be to set an 
agenda for the year and to share lessons learned from 
responses both large and small.
 
Membership
Like the Crisis Mappers Network, the forum would 
include practitioners and academics in crisis infor-
mation management, including members of the IASC 
Information Management Task Force. It would also 
include donors, senior managers, and members of civil 
society who have participated in a leadership role in pre-
vious and ongoing emergencies. By inviting represen-
tatives from member states that received humanitarian 
assistance, the forum could harness lessons learned 
and focus on approaches that build the capacity 
of disaster-affected communities. The forum itself will 
decide the mechanism for ensuring inclusive member-
ship while also keeping the size of the conversation 
manageable. The forum might request to elect a mem-
ber to represent it at the IASC Information Management 
Task Force meetings as an observer.
To build the capacity for in-house facilitation, the forum 
should enlist the aid of critical individuals in the social 
networks of the international humanitarian system and 
V&TCs—the so-called supernodes identified by many 
of the interviewed respondents, including Nigel Snoad, 
Paul Currion, and Patrick Meier. It should also lever-
age connections to major communities of practice, 
including Crisis Mappers, OCHA, and Crisis Commons, 
though it should maintain an existence separate from 
these institutions, which have a different focus. The 
Humanitarian Technology Forum is first and foremost 
a neutral space between V&TCs and the international 
humanitarian system; it cannot serve that role if it is itself 
merged with an existing V&TC.
 
Budget
The forum’s budget would include paying facilitators 
to establish a safe holding environment and to assist 
the community with any major conflicts. This could be 
treated as a start-up cost which would eventually dis-
appear. The budget would also include some amount 
to enable an annual a meeting of 100–150 people and 
quarterly meetings of 20–30 people, with at least some 
travel funds for small V&TCs who have little budget for 
these trips.
HUMANITARIAN INNOVATION LAB
Cross-organizational experimentation plays a critical 
role in the advancement of tools, practices, and poli-
cies. Most institutions design new information systems 
based on internal requirements. As a result, they op-
timize solutions to their own agendas, leaving little 
budget or staff time for the larger problem of coordi-
nation. As expectations for coordinated action among 
clusters and V&TCs increases, each organization will 
need develop methods to open its data to partners. 
There are very few venues for organizations to explore 
how to increase their openness to outsiders and make 
their systems both permeable and interoperable. The 
Humanitarian Lab would be way to provide this space.
The lab would find ways to connect data to specific 
decision making cycles. It would take recommenda-
tions from the Humanitarian Forum, Humanitarian 
Information Coordination Cell, and the Humanitarian 
Research & Training Consortium, exploring possible 
solutions to gaps in crisis information management. 
Its especial focus would be the bridge between the 
V&TCs and the formal humanitarian systems. To that 
end, lab would use open standards and would be 
biased towards open source software (though the lab 
would work with the vendor community to foster the 
use of service-oriented architectures with open APIs 
so as to integrate proprietary systems currently in use 
Credit: IRIN
57
like it is); to do rapid prototyping; to try things out in the field, 
fail utterly but instructively, and then try again. 
–Robert Kirkpatrick, UN Global Pulse
in the field). The lab would explore how to apply the 
data schema in the Common Operational Dataset to 
specific objects in the field, for instance, developing 
specific semantics to describe water bladders, sup-
plies, and other objects that have not already been 
so characterized, building on existing work by the 
Logistics, Health, and Camp Management clusters. 
It would also explore how to integrate information 
gleaned from crowdsourcing applications into the 
coordination of response operations. One example 
would be how to integrate local leaders into on- and 
off-line discussions during an emergency operation. 
Design
Taking advantage of best practices for these innovation 
labs, the Humanitarian lab would exist half-inside and 
half-outside the UN. After exploring the possibility that 
the lab might exist as a virtual organization, interview-
ees strongly recommended that the lab bring together 
developers into a physical space. 
 
 
The lab would require physical space, where an initial 
staff might draw together UN and NGO staff with 
independent contractors from V&TCs to work out 
proper design before evolving the lab into a more for-
mal UN entity. It might also explore partnerships with 
NGOs that focus on cross-organizational technology 
issues, such as NetHope. This initial pilot would be suf-
ficient to support 1–2 coordinators to get the lab off the 
ground. At scale, the lab may model UN Global Pulse, 
which has about a dozen staff. Its other ‘staff’ would 
be personnel who are seconded from other agencies, 
NGOs, and V&TCs for the purpose of working on prob-
lems identified by the Humanitarian Technology Forum 
and Humanitarian Research & Training Consortium. 
The staff—who might be called ‘fellows’ to parallel the 
academic concept of an individual involved in a time-
limited research project—might also include members 
of the coordination cell who wish to collaborate on 
improving tools and methods from the field. The team 
would be consciously built from a small core of profes-
sionals from various skill sets: business analysis, infor-
mation management, database design, and standards 
building. 
To ensure that policy and ethical questions are 
addressed within the initial designs of the project, 
OCHA would augment its policy staff and provide 
an officer whose role is to ensure full respect for and 
adherence to humanitarian principles and to work them 
into the design of solutions built in the labs. This would 
ensure that humanitarian principles are baked into the 
design of prototypes—embedded in the code itself.
The lab would need a physical office, with meeting 
spaces to convene developers to discuss hard prob-
lems in the humanitarian space. Following the lead of 
UN Global Pulse and the InSTEDD Innovation Labs, 
much of the time, staff would also travel to regional and 
field offices with personnel who are closest to prob-
lems in the field.
UN Global Pulse would like to partner with the Humani-
tarian Innovation Lab. It may well be possible to devel-
op additional partnerships with the World Bank Global 
Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction Labs and the UNI-
CEF Innovation Unit to share costs and build network 
effects around the people working on shared problems. 
You cannot innovate at velocity to create useful humanitar-
ian tools without interpersonal contact—trust building; sitting 
together; spontaneously drawing things, erasing, and redraw-
ing. Brainstorming over coffee, grumbling over a beer, breaking 
things together and fixing them together. You need a space for a 
passionate, dynamic, multi-disciplinary in-house team to gather 
requirements (by hosting people who come to visit and tell it 
“
” 
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Budget
The start-up budget would support 1–2 full-time 
employees (FTEs) who would build a network of open-
source developers around the initiative and piggy-
back with other innovation labs at the UN, including 
the Global Pulse and UNICEF teams. This small team 
would grow to around a dozen FTEs, many of whom 
may be seconded from their respective organizations. 
The budget would include travel funds for core devel-
opers who volunteer their time and/or are seconded 
from their own organizations to work from field offices 
in the developing world. The lab might eventually 
curate an investment fund to commission software 
from the developed and developing world, preferably 
using best-practice models for investing in small-to-
medium sized businesses. 17
 
Processes
The Lab would craft and advance tools, practices, and 
policies enable all stakeholders to humanitarian emer-
gencies—beneficiaries, donors, member states, inno-
vators, and operational organizations—to make better 
decisions on partial data, and to manage the handoff of 
data from preparatory work to responders and then to 
steward data from responders to development agencies. 
 
It would provide a safe place for experimentation, where 
stakeholders from across the V&TCs and international 
humanitarian community could explore common prob-
lems and devise solutions based on the best available 
solutions. Where necessary, the lab would explore the 
development of new applications from scratch. The 
development process would be oriented around inclu-
sive, participatory analysis of problems and collabora-
tive approaches to innovation. The lab would convene 
thought leaders from various technology projects (pub-
lic and private) and seek ways to connect their tools 
together like legos. The lab might also explore open in-
novation models that incorporate the power of crowds 
to contribute to collective solutions. The lab would 
foster an ethos of iterative learning, where experi-
mentation leads to attempts, which may fail but which 
reveal some new element of insight into the problem. 
Creating this safe space for creative failure and cre-
ative destruction requires certain protections from the 
demands of performance metrics that are typical in a 
large organization. Innovators have to be free to fail. 
It should be emphasized to management that success 
in this context is in the quality of the thinking. That is, 
success is not in the number of fielded ideas generated 
by a process, but how the learning from problem solv-
ing changes the approach to problems themselves. It 
should be noted that the strength of the relationships 
created across clusters and V&TCs is another measure 
of success, as these relationships will be the pathways 
by which solutions flow during crisis response operations.
As part of this work, the lab would also work closely 
with the following entities:
÷ The IASC Standing Task Force on Information 
Management and cluster system for humanitarian 
coordination.
÷ OCHA ISS for data standards, common operational 
dataset, and field practices. 
÷ Connection into the proposed UN Center of Excel- 
lence on Spatial Data Infrastructure (COE on SDI).
÷ UN CITO efforts on crisis information management 
(CIM).
In any community of practice you have a core group, which does 
a lot of the work. And I’m talking about this in terms of discussion. 
I think the key will be to make sure that core group is enabled and 
empowered to pick up the slack when the emergency hits both in 
terms of guaranteeing the service level response—almost like a 
service agreement.      –Paul Currion
“
” 
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÷ UN Global Pulse for innovation labs and collective 
intelligence.
÷ World Bank Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion Labs.
 
HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION 
COORDINATION CELL (HICC)
Multiple veterans of field operations called for the 
creation of some organization that would be respon-
sible for building a composite picture of response 
operations. Many had hopes for a simpler version of the 
Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC), which deploys 
to major emergencies to augment information manage-
ment processes. While some interviewees called for a 
new NGO, some looked toward extensions of existing 
volunteer entities, like the deployment of trained V&TC 
field operators under the Crisis Mappers Standby Task 
Force (SBTF). What was clear is that some entity would 
need to provide reliable and consistent services under 
a service level agreement to troubleshoot issues that 
clusters and NGOs are experiencing in the field around 
data collection, visualization, and analysis (as well as 
other IM challenges). 
 
Design
One suggested entity would be an NGO, whose mis-
sion is to deploy under OCHA to support the fusion of 
information into a common operational picture. It would 
contract with V&TC organizations like the Crisis Map-
pers Standby Task Force to deploy coordination cells 
under the OCHA team and provide services at reach-
back locations in countries of convenience to all parties 
(likely NYC or Geneva). 
This new coordination cell would augment the former 
role of the HIC and focus on creating information man-
agement services that stitch fragmented information 
systems into a composite picture of the operations. It 
would operate under a mandate from OCHA to deploy 
to large or complex emergencies (or both) to become 
problem solvers, helping cluster staff collect, character-
ize, analyze, and visualize data so that decision makers 
have a full picture of the operation. 
 
Staff
The team on the coordination cell would draw together 
specialties in information management, including GIS 
analysis, needs assessments, database management, 
data schema, data transformation, SMS-based crowd-
sourcing, communications, and information design. 
Members might be drawn from each cluster’s area of 
specialty, especially during complex emergencies. 
Physicians with experience in informatics would be 
particularly valuable, as they tend to understand how 
information impacts critical decisions in public health 
as well as the overall administration of the response. 
The staff would likely also be drawn from entities like 
MapAction, IMMAP, and the Crisis Mappers Standby 
Task Force. 
 
Budget
The budget would be similar to MapAction: under a 
memorandum of understanding, donors to UN agen-
cies and private sector groups would be invited to 
fund deployments of small teams to major crises. The 
entity would work between crises developing and test-
ing tools with the Humanitarian Labs.
 
Credit: OCHA/Akiko Harayama
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Processes
The staff would play the critical role of fixer: a team of 
information management experts who can assist clus-
ters in understanding data faster and more accurately 
than current methods allow. They would evangelize 
and train field staff and V&TCs on use of the common 
operational dataset. The entity would deploy under 
some kind of service level agreements that enable 
the organization to grow into the hectic tempo of 
humanitarian emergencies. The team would also field 
test prototypes and solutions from the lab, determining 
the maturity of the solution for deployment to the field.
 
HUMANITARIAN RESEARCH & TRAINING 
CONSORTIUM (HRTC)
There is a need for neutral, scientific evaluation of 
tools, practices, measurement of impact and policies 
in humanitarian information management, as well as 
for training of current and future humanitarians in best 
practices in information management. Academia is the 
natural home for this activity. The Humanitarian Re-
search and Training Consortium would be a network of 
educational institutions around the world with commit-
ments to various forms of humanitarian education that 
enter into partnership to offer several types of training 
and M&E:
÷ Funded by grants to provide training to V&TCs in 
humanitarian principles, field practices, cluster sys-
tem integration. 
÷ Funded by grants to provide retreats to formal 
and informal humanitarian field staff to reflect on re-
cent operations and integrate lessons learned into 
practices for information management and decisio.n 
support.
÷ Funded by grants to staff from UN agencies 
and NGOs to learn how to integrate new tools and 
practices from the V&TCs into humanitarian opera-
tions, including training in basic geospatial analysis 
and crowdsourcing. This would be the equivalent of 
translational research from medicine, which explores 
how to bring new drugs from the laboratory bench to 
the bedside.
 
Design
A consortium of universities and programs would be 
linked together across continents to align research 
and training programs to current problems, not only 
in information management, but also across the spec-
trum of issues in humanitarian affairs. This consortium 
would be coordinated by a council convened under the 
Humanitarian Forum. As with most academic consortia, 
it would not seek to create a centralized authority struc-
ture; instead, it would use a collegial mechanism for 
aligning efforts and ensuring common standards. It 
would be prudent to leave the design of this mecha-
nism to discussions between specific institutions, each 
of which will bring its own traditions to the dialogue.
 
Staff
Partners at educational institutions would manage the 
consortium on behalf of OCHA, liaising with staff at the 
Humanitarian Labs and the coordination cell. In the 
initial stages, the Humanitarian Studies Initiative (HSI) 
might convene the core partnership, tying together 
Tufts University, Harvard University, and MIT with other 
partners in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas. HSI 
Credit: UNICEF/Marco Dormino
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has already been performing research and training in 
humanitarian operations for several years, primarily 
centered on public health. It would need to work with 
partners to expand to a global scale and to ensure tran-
sition to a larger consortium of equals. A core focus 
should be on recruiting institutions from the developing 
world to take leadership roles in the consortium, har-
nessing the thematic and regional expertise that they 
bring to the dialogue.
Processes
The Consortium would engage in several areas of activity:
1. Research: exploration of problems in information 
management, crisis pattern identification, impact 
assessment, verification and validation of citizen-
generated data, organizational designs of crisis 
operations, and other issues as determined by 
innovative minds and discussions in the Humanitar-
ian Forum.
2. Training: training and certification to V&TCs in the 
methods of the formal humanitarian community, in 
technology and information management, and in the 
innovative methods for supporting decision making 
to all-comers.
3. Monitoring and Evaluation: reporting on the les-
sons learned from the application of new techniques 
in information management. One key area of focus 
would be on ideas generated by the Humanitarian 
Forum, developed by the Humanitarian Lab, and 
deployed by the Coordination Cell. 
4. Convening Humanitarian Forum. The consor-
tium would provide the convening space for a neu-
tral forum with alternative sites around the world to 
foster inclusion of humanitarians from across 
the globe.
Credit: UNICEF/Marco Dormino
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DIALOGUE
The purpose of this document is not to set forth the 
final word on how to connect new information flows into 
the international humanitarian system; but to initiate a 
conversation about the design challenges involved 
with this endeavor. Getting beyond the fog of informa-
tion will take political commitment, time, and diligent 
effort. Technologists will need to connect information 
flows from their organizations into the Semantic Web. 
Policy makers will need to determine what information 
is safe to release to the global public and under what 
conditions. And V&TCs will need to discover how to 
best integrate new thinking into existing international 
systems.
There are many open questions that emerge in 
a world where V&TCs and affected populations are 
active stakeholders in the cluster system. What tools 
and practices will be needed when clusters can 
exchange data on their operations, and coordinate their 
field activities with hundreds of organizations in other 
clusters? What happens when all data collected from 
surveys can be linked with other data in the operation, 
enabling everyone to see the relationships between an 
indicator for cholera and the status of medical supplies 
to treat this disease?
In this future, there might be more time for field staff to 
focus on comparing past and present—to find patterns 
from previous operations repeating themselves, and to 
catch the dynamic sufficiently early to take proactive 
steps to mitigate disease outbreaks, medical supply 
stock outs, and predictive logistics around where IDPs 
are just starting to congregate. Working with patterns 
and trends will raise new technical and organizational 
challenges. What evidence constitutes a pattern, and 
when does one known when a pattern is occurring 
the chaos of a sudden onset emergency? When does 
this pattern trigger administrative actions, including 
requests for funding? It is our hope that these ques-
tions will be in the near future.
07
Credit: FAO/Truls Brekke, MapAction, Ushahidi/Jonathan Shuler
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If this dynamic is going to work, it will happen when 
stakeholders come together and perform a critical 
task: engaging in active listening. Interviews for this 
report revealed that the longer a person tends to be in 
humanitarian operations, the greater an awareness of 
the complexity of the problem. Often, the awareness 
generates a practical sense of humility about what any 
individual can do or know, as well as comfort in leaning 
into discomfort that divergent views may expose. This 
wisdom, humility, and willingness to listen and engage 
in difficult conversations will be the keys to success in 
the dialogues that follow. 
Credit: OCHA/Akiko Harayama
64
The information systems that are used to manage core processes 
in an enterprise, including logistics, finances, human resources, procurement, 
and other data sets that are critical to operations.
Mobile communications service that provides both voice and broadband 
data simultaneously through a single, compact device on a global basis.
Cloud computing describes computation, software, data access, and 
storage services that do not require end-user knowledge of the physical 
location and configuration of the system that delivers the services.
A unified system of space data acquisition and delivery to those affected 
by natural or man-made disasters.
An expression that means “concerning law,” as contrasted with de facto, 
which means “concerning fact.” The terms de jure and de facto are 
used instead of “in principle” and “in practice,” respectively, when one is 
describing political or legal situations.
A verb meaning to position a point at a specific latitude and longitude.
Model that seeks to reconcile schemas from humanitarian response 
agencies. When possible, it matches humanitarian attributes to existing 
map features in OpenStreetMap.
The umbrella educational program led by Harvard Humanitarian Initia-
tive, including the Humanitarian Studies Course (HSC) and Humanitarian 
Studies in the Field. Educational content includes seminar series in 
essential crisis management and field simulation exercises. 
The core set of beliefs of the humanitarian community that govern the 
way humanitarian operations are carried out including humanity, impar-
tiality, operational independence, and neutrality. OCHA On Message: 
Humanitairan Principles states: “Humanitarian principles provide the 
fundamental foundations for humanitarian action.
Humanitarian principles are central to establishing and maintaining ac-
cess to affected populations whether in the context of a natural disaster, 
an armed conflict or a complex emergency. Promoting compliance with 
humanitarian principles in humanitarian response is an essential element 
of effective humanitarian coordination.” 
(ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1164797) 
ANNEX 1: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
BACK END SYSTEM
BROADBAND GLOBAL AREA NET-
WORK (BGAN)
CLOUD
DISASTER SPACE CHARTER
 
DE JURE
 
GEOLOCATE
HUMANITARIAN DATA MODEL (HDM)
HUMANITARIAN STUDIES INITIATIVE 
(HSI)
HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES
65
Key documents that establish humanitarian principles are the Code of 
Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and NGOs in Disaster Relief ( http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/doc-
uments/misc/code-of-conduct-290296.htm ) and the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 46/182. ( http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/47/a47r168.htm )
Open source projects allow anyone to download and install a copy of 
their software and to run it on compatible computers or servers. Each 
copy running on the Web is called an instance.
A web page or application that uses and combines data, presentation or 
functionality from two or more sources to create new services.
An online microtasking/crowdsourcing marketplace. See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_Mechanical_Turk
Online micro-volunteering is an example of virtual volunteering and crowd-
sourcing, where volunteers undertake assignments, or micro-tasks, via 
their PDAs or smartphones. Originally called “byte-sized volunteering” by 
the Virtual Volunteering Project.
Mission 4636 is a partnership between Samasource, 1000 Jobs Haiti, FA-
TEM, Union Haiti, Stanford, Energy for Opportunity, CrowdFlower, SEIU, The 
Crisis Mappers Network, Ushahidi, FrontlineSMS, Thompson-Reuters Foun-
dation, InSTEDD, The US State Department, Microsoft Research, Digicel, 
Voila, and a dozen more Haitian NGOs. It was affiliated with Internews and 
the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities initiative.
Collaborative inter-agency website designed to enhance humanitarian 
coordination within the cluster approach, and support the predictable 
exchange of information in emergencies at the country level.
A norm for technical systems derived by an open process and published 
in an open format, usually royalty free. The World Wide Web consortium 
includes a set of principles which may resonate with the humanitarian 
community (from Wikipedia):
÷ transparency (due process is public, and all technical discussions, 
meeting minutes, are archived and can be referenced in decision making)
÷ relevance (new standardization is started upon due analysis of the 
market needs, including requirements phase, e.g. accessibility, multi-
linguism)
÷ openness (anybody can participate, and everybody does: industry, 
individual, public, government bodies, academia, on a worldwide scale) 
 
INSTANCE (SOFTWARE)
MASHUP
 
MECHANICAL TURK
 
MICRO-TASKING
 
 
 
MISSION 4636
 
ONERESPONSE
OPEN STANDARDS
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÷ impartiality and consensus (guaranteed fairness by the process 
and the neutral hosting of the W3C organization, with equal weight for 
each participant)
÷ availability (free access to the standard text, both during develop-
ment and at final stage, translations, and clear IPR rules for implemen-
tation, allowing open source development in the case of Internet/Web 
technologies)
÷ maintenance (ongoing process for testing, errata, revision, perma-
nent access) See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_standard.
 
A military term referring to the placement of resources, capabilities, and 
expertise at a physical distance from an area of interest, supporting the 
people who are there performing their tasks. 
Special telephone numbers, significantly shorter than full telephone 
numbers, which can be used to address SMS and MMS messages from 
mobile phones or fixed phones. There are two types of short codes: 
dialing and messaging.
The text communication service component of phone, web or mobile 
communication systems, using standardized communications protocols 
that allow the exchange of short text messages between fixed line or 
mobile phone devices.
A series of civil-military demonstrations that show methods for civilian 
and military agencies around the world to work effectively together within 
a disaster response.
Individuals who are highly connected in the small world of humanitarian 
operations. They are hubs who play a crucial role routing information, 
bridging organizational boundaries, and healing broken connections 
when staff rotate from one role to the next. 
An effort to convene the many stakeholders to crisis response operations 
and to “harmonize the use of tools and systems to produce, disseminate 
and archive information in a manner that can be scaled up or rapidly 
focused to deal with any type of crisis.” See http://ict4peace.org/what-
wedo/the-crisis-information-management-strategy.
Eleven groups of UN agencies, NGOs and other international organiza-
tions arranged based on a sector or service they provide during a hu-
manitarian crisis: Protection, Camp Coordination and Management, 
Water Sanitation and Hygiene, Health, Emergency Shelter, Nutrition, 
Emergency Telecommunications, Logistics, Early Recovery, Education 
and Agriculture. Each cluster is led by a designated agency. The system 
was established by the UN IASC in 2005. 
Combining outsourcing with upgrading
An internet site that collects information from diverse sources, then 
displays it in a unified way. Also known as a links page. 
 
REACH BACK
 
 
SHORTCODE
 
SHORT MESSAGE SERVICE (SMS)
 
STRONG ANGEL
SUPERNODES
 
UN CRISIS INFORMATION MANAGE-
MENT STRATEGY (UN CIM)
 
UN CLUSTER SYSTEM
UPSOURCING
WEB PORTAL
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A software system designed to support interoperable machine-to- 
machine interaction over a network.
A website that allows the creation and editing of any number of interlinked 
web pages via a web browser using a simplified markup language or text 
editor.
Mobile communications service that provides both voice and broadband 
data simultaneously through a single, compact device on a global basis.
A coordination mechanism facilitated by UN OCHA to plan, implement 
and monitor humanitarian activities. Includes preparation of coordinated 
appeals for funding from the international community and donors when a 
humanitarian crisis response requires international response from more 
than one organization.
Crisis Information Management
A predictable, core sets of data needed to support operations and deci-
sion making for all actors in a humanitarian response.
A system adopted by the UN to simplify the means by which countries 
are reimbursed for providing equipment, personnel and self-sustainment 
support services to formed military or police contingents in peacekeep-
ing missions.
Design, Monitoring and Evaluation
Delta State University in Mississippi
Thomson-Reuters Foundation Emergency Information Service – deploys 
expert Action-Units of journalists to scenes of major catastrophe where 
they seek out, collate and disseminate information to disaster-struck pop-
ulations.
A high level position in the United Nations that heads the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The ERC serves as the UN Under-
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs.
European Union 
First assessment system toolset for the first 72 hours. 
Full time equivalent 
A partnership of 36 countries and 6 international organizations commit-
ted to helping developing countries reduce their vulnerability to natural 
hazards and adapt to climate change. 
WEB SERVICES
 
WIKI
BROADBAND GLOBAL AREA NET-
WORK (BGAN)
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS 
(CAP)
 
CIM
COMMON OPERATIONAL DATASET 
(COD)
CONTINGENT OWNED EQUIPMENT 
(COE)
 
 
DM&E
DSUM
EMERGENCY INFORMATION SERVICE 
(EIS) 
 
EMERGENCY RELIEF COORDINATOR
(ERC)
 
EU 
 
FAST72
FTE
GLOBAL FACILITY FOR DISASTER 
REDUCTION AND RECOVERY (GFDRR)
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Geographic information system
Global positioning system 
Model that seeks to reconcile schemas from humanitarian response 
agencies. When possible, it matches humanitarian attributes to existing 
map features in OpenStreetMap
Humanitarian Free Open Source Software: a collaborative, community-
building project started by computing faculty and open source propo-
nents at Trinity College, Wesleyan University, and Connecticut College.
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative – interdisciplinary academic and research 
center that works to relieve human suffering in war and disaster by ad-
vancing the science and practice of humanitarian response. 
Humanitarian Information Coordination Cell
Humanitarian Studies Initiative – the umbrella educational program led 
by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, including the Humanitarian Studies 
Course (HSC) and Humanitarian Studies in the Field. Educational content 
includes seminar series in essential crisis management and field simula-
tion exercises. 
Humanitarian Research & Training Consortium
Committee that aims to improve coordination of humanitarian assistance 
through its membership, which includes both UN and non-UN humanitar-
ian partners. 
Information Communication Technology
A foundation that aims to enhance the performance of the international 
community in crisis management through the use of ICTs.
Internally displaced person
International humanitarian systems
Nairobi’s Innovation Hub for the technology community is an open space 
for the technologists, investors, tech companies and hackers in the area. 
This space is a tech community facility with a focus on young entrepre-
neurs, web and mobile phone programmers, designers and researchers. 
It is part open community workspace, part vector for investors and VCs 
and part incubator.
Information management
Humanitarian organization that for more than a decade has worked on 
the effective use of information management practices and principles in 
service to the world’s most vulnerable populations.
GIS
GPS
HUMANITARIAN DATA MODEL (HDM)
 HFOSS
HHI
HICC
HIS
 HRTC
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMIT-
TEE (IASC)
 
ICT
INFORMATION COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACE (ICT4PEACE)
IDP 
 
IHS
INNOVATION HUB (IHUB)
 
 
 
 
 
IM 
 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & 
MINE ACTION PROGRAMS (IMMAP)
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Information management officer
A non-profit organization focused on bottom up design and development 
of tools and services for social good. 
 
Monitoring & evaluation
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
Memorandum of Understanding
A legally constituted group that operates independently from any govern-
ment. They generally pursue social goals, but are not overtly political. 
They are sometimes referred to as civil society organizations.
New York University Tisch School of the Arts Interactive Telecommunica-
tions Program
OCHA is the arm of the UN Secretariat that is responsible for bringing to-
gether humanitarian actors to ensure coherent response to emergencies. 
OCHA’s mission is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled 
humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors 
in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advo-
cate for the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and preven-
tion; and facilitate sustainable solutions. 
OCHA Information Services Section
Community of hundreds of thousands of mappers dedicated to building 
a free and open map of the world.
Rochester Institute of Technology
Return on investment
An online volunteer-based community that turns ad hoc groups of tech-
savvy mapping volunteers that emerge around crises into a flexible, 
trained and prepared network ready to deploy. Represents the first wave 
in Online Community Emergency Response Teams, first launched at the 
2010 International Conference on Crisis Mapping (ICCM 2010) to stream-
line online volunteer support for crisis mapping following lessons learned 
in Haiti, Chile and Pakistan.
Spatial data infrastructure
San Diego State University
A labor union in the United States, focused on organizing workers in 
health care, public services, and property services. 
IMO
INNOVATIVE SUPPORT TO EMERGEN-
CIES DISEASES AND DISASTERS 
(INSTEDD) 
 
M&E
MINUSTAH
MOU
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZA-
TION (NGO)
 
NYU ITP
 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE 
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
AFFAIRS (OCHA)
 
 
OCHA ISS 
 
OPENSTREETMAP (OSM)
 
RIT
ROI
STANDBY TASK FORCE (SBTF)
 
 
SDI
SDSU
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATION-
AL UNION (SEIU) 
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Service level agreement
Small and medium enterprise
The text communication service component of phone, web or mobile 
communication systems,  using standardized communications protocols 
that allow the exchange of short text messages between fixed line or mo-
bile phone devices.
United Nations Chief Information Technology Officer
A stand-by team of disaster management professionals who are nominat-
ed and funded by member governments, OCHA, United Nations Devel-
opment Program and operational humanitarian United Nations Agencies 
such as WFP, UNICEF and WHO.
Organization that links the UN’s work with others around the world, mo-
bilizing the energy and expertise of business and non-governmental or-
ganizations to help the UN tackle issues including climate change, chil-
dren’s health, peace and security, and poverty eradication.
UN High Commission for Refugees
The United Nations Children’s Fund
An autonomous body within the UN system with the purpose of enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of the UN through appropriate training and research.
A UN technology-intensive program that delivers imagery analysis and 
satellite solutions to relief and development organizations within and out-
side the UN system to help make a difference in humanitarian relief, hu-
man security, strategic territorial and development planning.
Urban search and rescue
Volunteer and Technical Communities
OCHA supported website that facilitates decision making for international 
response to major disasters though real-time information exchange by all 
actors of the international disaster response community.
Water, sanitation, and hygiene
The UN’s frontline hunger relief agency, WFP aims to bring food assis-
tance to more than 90 million people in 73 countries in 2011.
SLA
SME
SHORT MESSAGE SERVICE (SMS)
 
UN CITO 
 
UNITED NATIONS DISASTER AS-
SESSMENT AND COORDINATION 
TEAM (UNDAC)
 
UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION (UNF)
 
UNHCR
UNICEF 
 
UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR 
TRAINING AND RESEARCH (UNITAR) 
 
UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONAL 
SATELLITE APPLICATIONS PROGRAM 
(UNOSAT) 
 
 
USAR
V&TC
VIRTUAL ON-SITE OPERATIONS 
COORDINATION CENTRE (VIRTUAL 
OSOCC) 
 
WASH  
 
WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP)
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  action (such as a cholera outbreak automatically triggering an analysis of medical supply chains and water purifiers to the affected region)  
 would be highly unlikely. Such data would need to be pulled by a coordinator who understands the complex interdependencies of a cholera   
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 Code with at a specific latitude/longitude with z capacity. Without this level of specificity—including location-aware attributes for integration   
 into GIS applications—the common operational dataset will be hard to implement in way that facilitates breakdown of data silos.
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 Sterman, Business Dynamics (which takes a quantitative approach to systems thinking as applied to business processes).
12  The Common Operational Datasets (COD’s) are predictable, core sets of data needed to support operations and decision-making for all 
 actors in a humanitarian response. The COD’s are defined in the IASC Guidelines Common Operational Datasets (CODs) in Disaster  
 Preparedness and Response, Endorsed Nov 2010 http://bit.ly/eigMGI.
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16 Cf. The Practice of Adaptive Leadership from Ronald Heifetz taught at Harvard for 25 years and The U Process from Otto Scharmer and  
 applied by Peter Senge, which has been in use for nearly as long.
17 Although on another order of magnitude, the ‘KfW’ framework used by Germany to manage Marshall Plan funds over the past six decades 
 and reinvest those funds in small-to-medium-sized businesses might be a good thought exercise to ensure feedback loops will lead to  
 continual reinvestment.

